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[The Earned Income Tax Credit is] the best anti-poverty bill,
the best pro-family measure, and the best job creation program
ever to come out of the Congress of the United States.
– Ronald Reagan 1
[W]e will reward the work of millions of working poor
Americans by realizing the principle that if you work 40 hours
a week and you’ve got a child in the house, you will no longer
be in poverty.
– William Jefferson Clinton 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The earned income tax credit (“EITC”) is the largest federal cash
assistance poverty relief program in the United States today. 3 It is a powerful
1
Ronald Reagan, upon signing the 1986 Tax Reform Act which made the EITC a permanent
feature of the Code. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (Oct. 22, 1986), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/
102286a.htm; see also, Lea Donosky, Sweeping Tax Overhaul Now the Law, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23,
1986, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-10-23/news/8603190647_1_tax-codetax-reform-tax-bills-next-year.
2
William Jefferson Clinton, U.S. President, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on
Administration Goals, 139 CONG. REC. 2871, 2873 (Feb. 17, 1993), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232.
3
In 2010, the federal government spent $54.7 billion on the EITC, almost 30% of the entire
outlay for all public assistance and related programs combined ($183.1 billion including the
EITC). The second-largest needs-based cash assistance program in 2010 was the supplemental
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tool for reducing poverty among the lowest-level earners in American society.
President Obama, in his 2014 State of the Union Address, explained that “few
[measures] are more effective at reducing inequality and helping families pull
themselves up through hard work than the Earned Income Tax Credit. Right
now, it helps about half of all parents at some point.” 4 There have been regular
proposals for reform and improvement, 5 but the EITC is a successful and
popular program. 6 It is easy to understand why the EITC enjoys bipartisan
support; 7 the left appreciates the social welfare aspect of the credit, while the
security income program at $43.9 billion. In comparison, TANF (welfare) payments were only
$21.9 billion in 2010. The federal government spent $95 billion in 2010 on food and nutrition
assistance programs, including food stamps. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 2012, Sec. 9, 313, tbl. 474, available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2011pubs/12statab/fedgov.pdf.
4
Barack Obama, U.S. President, President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address (Jan.
28, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barackobamas-state-union-address.
5
See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax
Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 520 (2013); Kerry A. Ryan,
EITC as Income (In)Stability?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 583 (2014); George K. Yin et al., Improving
the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax
Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225 (1994).
6
Politicians are becoming increasingly concerned with the “welfare” aspect of the credit.
See STEVE HOLT, BROOKINGS INST., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30: WHAT WE
KNOW 3 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2006/02/children
families-holt. In the 2012 Presidential election, candidate Mitt Romney was secretly taped at a
fundraising event bemoaning that 47% of Americans pay no federal income taxes and are
dependent on the government. Candidate Romney noted that he would “never convince them
they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives.” Romney’s Speech from Mother
Jones Video, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/us/politics/mittromneys-speech-from-mother-jones-video.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The 47% statistic was
accurate. For tax year 2013, the number has decreased to about 43%. Importantly, about twothirds of the 43% pay payroll taxes, which means they are workers taken off the tax rolls by
policies like the EITC. Slightly less than one-fourth of the 43% are non-working elderly. Only
about 5% of all households fall outside these categories. TAX POL’Y CTR., URBAN INST. &
BROOKINGS INST., Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Tax, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/
federal-taxes-households.cfm (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). Mr. Romney’s interpretation of the
statistics reveals that the EITC is still viewed with some suspicion.
7
Republican support seems to be fading. See note 6 for a discussion of political concern
about the social welfare aspects of the EITC. Additional concern has focused on fraudulent EITC
claims. See Leslie Book, EITC Noncompliance: What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Them, 99 TAX
NOTES 1821 (2003). The IRS estimated that in fiscal year 2012, between 21–25% of EITC claims
were paid in error, with a dollar value between $11.6 and $13.6 billion. TREASURY INSPECTOR
GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REPORT NO. 2013-40-024, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WAS NOT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND
RECOVERY ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340024fr.pdf. Commentators were quick to report a 25%
“fraud” rate for the EITC. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, TIGTA: IRS Fails to Comply Mandated
Reduction in Improper Payments—25% Fraud Rate Costs $14 Billion/Year, TAXPROF BLOG
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/04/tigta-irs-.html. However, even
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right can stand behind the credit’s encouragement to work. 8 The EITC is
“welfare” 9 but only for “deserving poor” people; it is both qualities joined
together that have generated bipartisan support.10 However, the system leaves
many low level earners behind. Specifically, this Article examines how the
system cheats parents who do not live together.
Imagine two people who are unmarried and have two children together.
The couple used to live together, but now they live apart. They live in a rural
area. Dad commutes 30 miles each way to the nearest urban center to work two
part-time minimum-wage jobs to make ends meet. He is lucky to have the work
as he does not even have a high school diploma. Mom does not work outside
the home. There is little job opportunity in their rural area, and she lacks access
to reliable child care. Both are caring and responsible parents. The family court
placed both of the children with Mom, largely because of their work situations.
Dad’s schedule is erratic. He is often gone from home for work. Mom, being
unemployed, can devote more time to parenting. Dad pays child support and
has unsupervised visitation when his schedule permits. He almost always sees
the children on weekends, even when they cannot spend the night with him.
This is exactly the type of family that Congress intended to help with
the EITC. The family works; the family is low income; the family has children.
The EITC is intended to help lift this family (in particular the children) out of
poverty while simultaneously encouraging them to continue working. However,
currently, this family would receive $0 in EITC. That’s right—$0! This family

if the figure were accurate, the evidence is far from clear what percentage of the erroneous
payments stems from fraud perpetrated by taxpayers, what percentage stems from fraud
perpetrated by unscrupulous tax preparers, and what percentage stems from innocent errors in
filing, primarily due to the complexity of the law. See ROBERT GREENSTEIN ET AL., CTR. ON THE
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, REDUCING OVERPAYMENTS IN THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
(2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-30-13tax.pdf.
8
See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size
Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301 (2004) [hereinafter Zelenak, Family-Size
Adjustment to the Minimum Wage].
9
The Author hesitates to label the EITC welfare in any sense because welfare is a very
loaded term. Professor Brown has very eloquently argued that calling a program welfare amounts
to playing a race card. Programs perceived as welfare face far greater scrutiny; Professor Brown
argues this is so because most Americans associate welfare with black people. Dorothy A.
Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (2007). Despite this, it is
clear, as discussed infra, that the EITC is, at least in part, an anti-poverty social welfare program.
In other words, it is true that the EITC is, in part, “welfare.” The Author sincerely hopes that one
day we can call a spade a spade without fear of losing the farm.
10

There is a debate about whether the EITC is a tax benefit or a welfare program. The EITC
is best understood as both. The reason the EITC has been politically successful is due in large
part to its appeal to both sides of the political aisle. Those on the left can embrace the EITC’s
redistributive effect (its “welfare-ness”) while those on the right can embrace the EITC’s work
incentives (its “for the deserving poor only-ness”). See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The
Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1873 (2005)
[hereinafter Zelenak, Tax or Welfare?] (describing the EITC as a “hybrid tax-transfer program”).
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completely forfeits the most important federal anti-poverty benefit. Why?
Because Mom does not work but devotes herself to the children, relying on
Dad’s work for support. The exact same family would generate a large EITC
(up to $5,460 in 2014) if they lived together. However, because this family has
made a personal decision to live in separate homes, they lose an important
federal benefit.
This example is not fiction. It is based on actual clients that the Author
worked with at a low-income taxpayer clinic. Situations like this play out
repeatedly in law clinics across the country. Since the Great Recession, more
and more families living apart are finding themselves in this situation because
one of the parents has lost a job.
What causes families like this to lose the EITC and what can be done
about it? Children can save taxpayers a lot of money on taxes.11 However,
children cannot be claimed by more than one taxpayer. Detailed, and often
convoluted, eligibility rules determine who can claim children for various tax
purposes. 12 When a child can legitimately be claimed by more than one
taxpayer, tie-breaker rules determine the taxpayer allowed to claim the child.13
Although the eligibility and tie-breaker rules could be improved in many ways,
this Article examines one rule in particular. When a child’s parents live apart,
the custodial parent is allowed to claim the child. The custodial parent,
however, can waive his or her right to claim the child and allow the
noncustodial parent to claim the child. However, this waiver can only shift the
child for purposes of the dependent exemption amount and the child tax credit;
the waiver cannot shift the child for purposes of head of household filing status
or the EITC. This seriously limits the family’s ability to enhance the EITC
through tax planning. Upper-income families commonly use tax arbitrage to
increase the family’s wealth; there is no legitimate reason why lower-income
families should be prohibited from doing the same.
This Article proposes that Congress amend the Internal Revenue Code
(“Code”) 14 to allow custodial parents to sign a waiver granting the noncustodial
parent the right to claim a child not only for the child tax credit and dependent
exemption amount but also for the EITC. This Article does not propose other
changes in the eligibility rules. Although problems exist with the requirements

11
As discussed in infra Part III, in 2014 a qualifying child can potentially generate for a
taxpayer a $3,950 deduction for the dependent exemption amount, a $1,000 child tax credit, and
an EITC of up to $3,305, as well as potentially entitle the taxpayer to the larger standard
deduction and more favorable tax rates available to heads of households.
12

See infra Part III for a discussion of when a dependent qualifies a taxpayer for a dependent
exemption amount, the child tax credit, the EITC, and head of household status.
13

See infra Parts III.A.4 and III.A.5 for a discussion of what happens when more than one
taxpayer is entitled to claim a child.
14

In this Article, the word “Code” refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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for custodial parent waivers, 15 this Article does not propose changes to those
rules. This Article also does not systematically address possible reforms that
would address marriage penalties and bonuses in the EITC system, although
this Article discusses marriage penalties and bonuses in order to place the
proposal in context.
The first part of this Article discusses the EITC’s history and policy
objectives. The second part examines the mechanics of the current rule and
examines current opportunities for tax arbitrage. The third part analyzes the
current rule under traditional measures of tax policy analysis: horizontal and
vertical equity, efficiency, and neutrality. It also looks at the current rule’s
effectiveness at advancing the EITC’s policy goals. The Article ends with a
detailed analysis of the Author’s proposal and demonstrates why it is a superior
approach to the current system.
II.

HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to truly understand the EITC’s policy goals, one must
understand the political history of its enactment and subsequent expansions.
The EITC, brainchild of Senator Russell Long, 16 was born as a compromise
measure in response to President Nixon’s proposed “negative income tax.” 17
Nixon’s 1969 proposal, the “Family Assistance Plan,” was intended to replace
the Great Depression-era “Aid to Families with Dependent Children” program
(commonly known as “welfare”). 18 The family assistance plan borrowed
heavily from negative income tax concepts first proposed by Milton Friedman
in 1962. 19 Under a negative income tax, a person receives a payment equal to
some percentage of the amount by which their income is lower than a particular
threshold. 20 For example, if (1) the percentage is 50%, (2) the threshold is

15

See, e.g., Robert G. Nassau, How to Split the Tax Baby: What Would Solomon Do?, 61
SYRACUSE L. REV. 83 (2010).
16

Long was a Democratic Senator for Louisiana from December 31, 1948, until January 3,
1987. Long, Russell Billiu — Biographical Information, CONG. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=l000428 (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
17
Jane Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, Taxing Poor Families: The Evolution of Treatment
Under the Federal Income Tax, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 38 (2008); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The
Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
1969-99, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 983, 992 (2000) [hereinafter Ventry, Political History of the Earned
Income Tax Credit]; Jodie T. Allen, Present at the Creation, SLATE MAG. (Dec. 13, 1999, 9:56
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/1999/12/present_at_the_
creation.html.
18
19

Ventry, Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 17, at 987–88.
Zelenak, Family-Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, supra note 8.

20
Jodie T. Allen, Negative Income Tax, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
(David R. Henderson ed., 1st ed. 1993), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/
NegativeIncomeTax.html.
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$10,000, and (3) a person has no income, then he or she would receive a
payment of $5,000 [50% of ($10,000 minus $0)]. 21 In effect, the negative
income tax gives each person a guaranteed income. 22 Although Nixon’s
proposal contained some work incentives, conservatives deemed them
insufficient, and liberals were wary of the meager nature of the cash support
provided. 23
The family assistance plan came very close to passing Congress; 24
however, it was defeated in 1972. 25 That same year, Senator Long proposed the
EITC as an alternative, 26 but it too was rejected.27 The EITC continued to be
debated in Congress and ultimately was adopted in 1975.28 The legislative
history indicates the EITC was intended as an offset for payroll taxes paid by
low-income workers. 29 However, it also was a compromise measure born in
response to obvious interest in the negative income tax as an anti-poverty
tool. 30 In addition, the EITC responded to concerns about anti-work incentives
21
Id.; Leland G. Neuberg, Emergence and Defeat of Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP)
(Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.usbig.net/papers/066-NeubergFAP2.doc.
22

Allen, supra note 20; Neuberg, supra note 21.
Zelenak, Family-Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, supra note 8; see also Ventry,
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 17.
24
Zelenak, Family-Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, supra note 8.
23

25

Id. Intriguingly, there has been at least one recent call to resurrect the negative income tax
idea. Chris Farrell, It’s Time for a Negative Income Tax, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 8,
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-08/its-time-for-a-negative-income-tax.
26
Gravelle, supra note 17; V. Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax
Credit, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Robert Moffitt ed., Univ.
of Chic. Press 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10256.pdf; Zelenak, FamilySize Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, supra note 8, at 304 (“Long’s proposal was for a ‘work
bonus,’ a credit equal to 10% of the first $4,000 of earned income, with the credit phased out at
the rate of 25% as earned income rose above $4,000.”).
27
Ventry, Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 17, at 992.
28
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, tit. II, § 204(a), 89 Stat. 30, 30–31 (1975)
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
29
The House of Representatives included an EITC in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. Id. The
Senate Finance Committee indicated the purpose of the credit was to provide relief to earners
with little or no tax liability by providing a refundable tax credit based on earned income noting
that the credit amount was designed to “closely match [] the employee and employer social
security tax on the first $4,000 of income . . . .” S. REP. NO. 94-19, at 36 (1975). The committee
also found that it was “appropriate to use the income tax system to offset the impact of the social
security taxes on low-income persons . . . .” Id. at 29. The Senate Finance Committee agreed with
the House that it was appropriate to offset social security taxes through an income tax system. Id.
at 33.
30
While fully agreeing with the goal of offsetting payroll taxes for low wage workers, the
Senate Finance Committee had a narrower view of the scope of the new EITC. It explained that
“the most significant objective of the provision should be to assist in encouraging people to
obtain employment, reducing the unemployment rate and reducing the welfare rolls.” S. REP. NO.
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of traditional welfare 31 and the reduced, but still present, anti-work incentives
of negative income tax proposals. 32 Thus, the original EITC had several
different apparent purposes: (1) incentivize work, (2) reduce welfare rolls, and
(3) offset the burden of payroll taxes on those least able to afford them. 33
Every single U.S. President since 1975 has expanded the EITC.
President Ford signed the EITC into law in 1975.34 The credit was made
permanent in 1978 under President Carter 35 and was expanded and indexed for
inflation under President Reagan’s 1986 Tax Reform Act. 36 The credit was

9436, at 33 (1975). Thus, the Senate proposed an amendment increasing the amount of the credit
and restricting the credit to “individuals who maintain a household.” Id. at 34. The Senate wanted
to offset payroll taxes, but only for those individuals likely to be eligible for welfare payments if
they were not working. It was a strategy for moving families from welfare to work by making
work more attractive than welfare (or at least not more unattractive). The Conference Committee
adopted the Senate’s version of the EITC. H.R. REP. NO. 94-120, at 58–59 (1975). It passed
Congress and was signed by President Nixon.
31
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program of the 1960s did not
condition benefits on a mother working. Susan W. Blank & Barbara B. Blum, A Brief History of
Work Expectation for Welfare Mothers, 7 WELFARE TO WORK 28, 29–30 (1997), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/07_01_02.pdf. Also, the family’s
income offset their benefits, an obvious disincentive to work. Stephen B. Page & Mary B. Larner,
Introduction to the AFDC Program, 7 WELFARE TO WORK 20, 21 (1997), available at
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/07_01_01.pdf; see also Peter
Passell & Leonard Ross, Daniel Moynihan and President-Elect Nixon: How Charity Didn’t
Begin at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1973, http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/10/04/specials/
moynihan-income.html.
32
This legislation was, in part, a welfare-to-work initiative. The Senate report to the original
EITC legislation called the EITC a “work bonus” and noted that “[f]ederal welfare costs will be
reduced by an estimated $0.1 billion.” S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 3 (1975).
33
Payroll taxes are a flat percentage of covered income. Currently, employees pay payroll
taxes through wage withholding of 7.65% of covered wages. I.R.C. § 3101(a)–(b) (2014). A
worker making $10,000 in wages each year pays 7.65% of those wages as payroll taxes, and a
worker making $70,000 of wages each year also pays 7.65% of those wages as payroll taxes.
There is no effort to adjust the rates to reflect relative ability to pay. This flat tax system stands in
sharp contrast with the progressive rates of the federal income tax, where lower levels of income
are taxed at one percentage but higher levels of income are taxed at a higher percentage. The
Code is codified at Title 26 of the United States Code. Tax lawyers commonly cite directly to the
Code rather than to the United State Code, and this Article follows that convention. For example,
I.R.C. § 3101 is a reference to 26 U.S.C. § 3101.
34
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, tit. II, § 204(a), 89 Stat. 30, 30–31 (1975)
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
35
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, tit. I, §§ 104(a)–(e), 105(a), 92 Stat. 2763,
2772–73 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
36
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, tit. I, §§ 104(b)(1)(B), 111(a)–(d)(1), tit. XII,
§§ 1272(d)(4), tit. XIII, § 1301(j)(8), 100 Stat. 2085, 2104, 2107–08, 2594, 2658 (1986).
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expanded again in 1990 under President George H. W. Bush, introducing a
slightly higher credit for families with more than one child.37
Nineteen ninety-three was a significant year in the EITC’s history. In
1993, the credit was expanded under President Clinton, establishing a small
credit for childless workers and increasing the credit for workers with
children. 38 In 1993, the EITC’s two primary policy reasons became clearer. 39
The rate of the credit for childless workers was (and remains) 7.65%, equal to
the employee portion of federal payroll taxes,40 thus underscoring the EITC’s
stated purpose of functioning as a payroll tax offset. 41 Simultaneously, having
substantially larger credit amounts for workers with children was motivated by
the anti-poverty intent of the EITC. 42
The EITC continued to expand and develop in the 2000s. In 2001,
President George W. Bush signed legislation designed to alleviate marriage
penalties inherent in the EITC design. 43 Under President Obama, in 2008 the
EITC was temporarily expanded for tax years 2009 and 2010 to provide for the
first time a higher credit for families with three or more children.44 In 2010, this

37

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XI, §§
11101(d)(1)(B), 11111(a)–(b), 11111(e), 104 Stat. 1388-405, 1388-408, 1388-412, 1388-413
(1990) (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. § 32).
38

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, tit. XIII, ch. 1, pt. 3, §
13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433–35 (1993) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 32).
39

Arguably, there now are more than two policy objectives for the EITC. See Yin et al.,
supra note 5, at 260 (identifying as objectives of the EITC “a Social Security tax rebate, a work
incentive, an income supplement, a benefit for children of low-income families, and an offset
generally to regressive federal taxes”).
40

I.R.C. §§ 32(b)(1)(C), 3101(a)–(b) (2014).
According to the House Budget Committee’s report on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, “[T]he committee believes that extending the EITC to low-income working
taxpayers without qualifying children will provide these taxpayers with an additional benefit for
entering the labor force and reduce the burden of the individual income and payroll taxes on
those with a lower ability to pay taxes.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 609 (1993).
41

42
The House Budget Committee’s report explained that “[p]roviding a larger basic EITC to
larger families recognizes the role the EITC can play in alleviating poverty. Moreover, this larger
credit may provide work incentives and increase equity by reducing the tax burden for those
workers with a lower ability to pay taxes.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 609 (1993); see also supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
43
Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, tit. III, §§
303(a)–(f), (h), 115 Stat. 38, 55–57 (2001) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 32).
44
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-5, div. B., tit. I, §
1002, 123 Stat. 115, 312 (2009) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 32).

10

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

temporary expansion was extended through 2012. 45 In 2013, it was extended
again through 2017. 46
Twenty-seven states have enacted state versions of the EITC.47
Twenty-two of them are refundable, like the federal credit.48 Five of them are
nonrefundable. 49 Most piggyback off of the federal eligibility rules; if a
taxpayer is eligible for the federal credit, he or she is also eligible for the state
credit. 50 Even some localities have enacted small local credits.51
Understanding the political history of the EITC helps in analyzing the
structure and impact of the rules. The EITC often is described as a payroll
offset measure, and indeed that has been a purpose since the beginning. 52
However, the EITC also was part of the welfare reform and welfare-to-work
movements. 53 The EITC cannot legitimately be called a general anti-poverty
measure. Despite the small EITC for childless workers, the primary focus of the
EITC has been on alleviating poverty for families with children.54 Its main
concern is not with lifting people out of poverty, but with lifting children out of
poverty. 55

45

Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, tit. I, § 103(c), 124 Stat. 3296, 3299 (2010) (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. §
32).
46
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112240 § 103(c), 126 Stat. 2323,
2319–20 (2013) (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. § 32).
47
See States and Local Governments with Earned Income Tax Credit, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/States-and-Local-Governments-with-Earned-Income-Tax-Credit
(last visited Sept. 6, 2014); see also States with EITCs, TAX CREDITS FOR WORKING FAMILIES,
http://www.taxcreditsforworkingfamilies.org/earned-income-tax-credit/states-with-eitcs/
(last
visited Sept. 6, 2014).
48
See IRS, States and Local Governments with Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 47; see
also Tax Credits for Working Families, supra note 47.
49
See IRS, States and Local Governments with Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 47; see
also Tax Credits for Working Families, supra note 47.
50
See IRS, States and Local Governments with Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 47; see
also Tax Credits for Working Families, supra note 47.
51
See IRS, States and Local Governments with Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 47; see
also Tax Credits for Working Families, supra note 47.
52
53
54

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
However, in his 2014 State of the Union Address, President Obama indicated a desire to
bolster the credit for childless workers, saying, “I agree with Republicans like Senator Rubio that
it doesn’t do enough for single workers who don’t have kids. So let’s work together to strengthen
the credit, reward work, and help more Americans get ahead.” Obama, supra note 4. The
President’s proposal does not obviate the need for this Article’s proposal, however. Indeed, they
would work well in tandem.
55
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MECHANICS OF THE CURRENT RULE

In order to understand how current law impacts taxpayers and why this
Article’s proposal is a superior approach, it is necessary to understand how
current law functions. There are four primary child-based tax benefits: (1) the
dependent exemption, (2) the EITC, (3) the child tax credit, and (4) head of
household filing status. 56 Prior to 2005, the eligibility requirements for each
were distinctly different. In 2005, Congress attempted to adopt “uniform”
definitions of dependent and qualifying child.57 While the rules are more
uniform now, important (and confusing) differences remain. 58 All of these rules
are interrelated, however. To understand one, a person must understand the
others. This part examines the rules for each of these four benefits in
subsequent subparts. This part also analyzes the tax arbitrage opportunities
presented by the current rules. In other words, it looks at the extent to which
cooperative parents can generate tax savings under the current rules.
A. The Dependent Exemption Amount
Section 151 of the Code allows taxpayers to deduct from income a
“personal exemption” amount 59 for themselves, their spouse if filing jointly, 60
and for eligible dependents claimed on the return.61 For tax year 2014, 62 the

56

See Nassau, supra note 15.

57

Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, tit. II, 118 Stat. 1166,
1169–78, (2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Danshera
Cords, Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation Loans, and the Earned
Income Tax Credit: The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers and Provide More Free
Alternatives, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351, 360 (2009).
58
See Jonathan P. Schneller et al., The Earned Income Tax Credit, Low-Income Workers, and
the Legal Aid Community, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 176, 189 (2012) (“[T]he qualifying child issue
illustrates this complexity: a taxpayer’s child can be qualifying under the dependency exemption
but not for the EITC, or vice versa. The lack of a uniform definition of qualifying child confuses
claimants unfamiliar with the tax system . . . .”).
59

The term “exemption” is a confusing misnomer, given that the amount of the “personal
exemption” is actually a below-the-line deduction from adjusted gross income.
60

This is a simplification of the spousal exemption rules. If the taxpayers are filing jointly,
each gets a personal exemption as taxpayers. If they are not filing jointly, the taxpayer may claim
a personal exemption for his or her spouse if the spouse had no gross income and was not the
dependent of another taxpayer. I.R.C. § 151(b) (2014).
61

I.R.C. § 151.
Taxpayers must report their taxes on a fiscal year basis. Most individuals are required to
use the calendar year as their fiscal year. I.R.C. § 441. Therefore, “tax year 2014” for an
individual is the same as calendar year 2014. One potential source of confusion is the difference
between the tax year and the tax filing season. The return for tax year 2014 for an individual will
be due on April 15, 2015, without extensions. The filing season for tax year 2014 occurs in 2015.
Another potential source of confusion is the difference between a tax year and a fiscal year. Tax
62
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personal exemption amount is $3,950. 63 Beginning in 2013, personal
exemption amounts are phased out for higher-income taxpayers. 64 This subpart
examines the rules for claiming a personal exemption amount for a dependent.
First, there are general rules that all taxpayers must meet. Second, certain
dependents may be considered “qualifying children,” which is a status that
unlocks eligibility for the other child-based tax benefits. Third, certain
dependents may be considered “qualifying relatives.” Fourth, there are tiebreaker rules that apply when more than one taxpayer is eligible to claim a
dependent. Finally, there are exceptions to the normal rules that could allow a
noncustodial parent to claim a dependent with the consent of the custodial
parent. Each of these groups of rules is discussed in turn.
1. General Rules for Claiming Dependents
Three initial qualifying rules must be met before a taxpayer can claim a
dependent. The tests are as follows:
(1) Taxpayer Cannot Be a Dependent: The taxpayer must not be the
dependent of another taxpayer. 65 In other words, dependents cannot have
dependents.
(2) Potential Dependent Has Not Filed a Joint Return: If a person files
a joint return, that person cannot be the dependent of another taxpayer.66
However, if the return is only a claim for a refund (i.e., of income taxes
withheld) and neither spouse 67 would owe taxes had they filed separately, then
the joint return will not bar a dependency claim. 68

year 2014 for taxpayers using a non-calendar year fiscal year refers to the fiscal year that ends in
2014. Because this Article is discussing tax attributes that apply only to individuals, and because
almost all individuals report taxes on a calendar year basis, the term “tax year 2014” and similar
terms in this Article refer to calendar year 2014.
63
Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. There is a base exemption amount of $2,000
which is indexed annually for cost of living increases. I.R.C. §§ 151(d)(1), 151(d)(4)(A).
64
I.R.C. § 151(d)(3). In 2014, the exemption is subject to a phase-out that begins with
adjusted gross income of $254,200 ($305,050 for married couples filing jointly) and that phases
out completely at adjusted gross income of $376,700 ($427,550 for married couples filing
jointly). Rev. Proc. 13-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
65
I.R.C. § 152(b)(1). For example, if a grandparent lives with his or her child and grandchild,
and if the grandparent is eligible to claim the child as a dependent, the child may not claim the
grandchild as a dependent on a tax return.
66
I.R.C. § 152(b)(2).
67
This Article considers persons married if they are considered married under the Code. If
Code section 7703 allows a married couple to be considered unmarried, this Article also
considers them unmarried. See I.R.C. § 7703.
68
See Martino v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 456 (1978); see also Rev. Rul. 54-567, 1954-2 C.B. 108,
aff’d Rev. Rul. 65-34, 1965-1 C.B. 86.
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(3) Citizenship Test: The potential dependent must be a citizen or
national 69 of the United States or a resident of the United States, 70 Canada, or
Mexico. 71
If these threshold tests are met, a dependent exemption is allowed if the
dependent is either a “qualifying child” or a “qualifying relative.” 72
2. Qualifying Child
The definition of qualifying child is critical to all of the child-based tax
benefits. The qualifying child rules are incorporated into all of the child-based
tax benefits, 73 with important exceptions that are discussed as they arise. The
following tests apply for “qualifying child” status:
(1) Relationship Test: The dependent must be (a) the taxpayer’s child,
stepchild, or eligible foster child74 or the descendent of such person or (b) the
taxpayer’s brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, half-brother, or half-sister or
the descendant of such person. 75 One does not need to be the taxpayer’s child to
be a “qualifying child.”
(2) Residence Test: The dependent must have the same “principal
place of abode” as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the tax year. 76 There

69

U.S. nationals are people who are not citizens of the United States but who are born in or
have ties to a possession of the United States. The term “national” was added alongside the term
“citizen” starting in tax year 1972 in order to give American Samoans the right to personal
exemption amounts. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-580, 86 Stat. 1276 (1972).
70
A resident of the United States for tax purposes is not defined solely by immigration laws.
A person can be a U.S. resident for tax purposes (1) if he or she is a lawful permanent resident
under the U.S. immigration laws or (2) if he or she meets a substantial presence test designed to
determine whether the person was physically present in the United States (authorized or not) for
a substantial amount of time during the tax year. I.R.C. § 7701(b). See also Blankson v. Comm’r,
No. 10845-00S, 2003 WL 356118 (U.S. Tax Ct.) (2003) (non-reviewable case, persuasive value
only).
71
I.R.C. § 152(b)(3). There is an exception for children adopted by or placed for adoption
with a taxpayer who is a citizen or national of the United States if the child lives with the
taxpayer as a member of the taxpayer’s household. I.R.C. § 152(b)(3)(B).
72
I.R.C. § 152(a).
73
For example, if a taxpayer has a qualifying child, that potentially allows the taxpayer to
claim a dependent exemption amount, a child tax credit, an EITC, and head of household status.
These rules are discussed in detail in this Part III.
74
The term “eligible foster child” means “an individual who is placed with the taxpayer by
an authorized placement agency or by judgment, decree, or other order of any court of competent
jurisdiction.” I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(C).
75
I.R.C. §§ 152(c)(1)(A), 152(c)(2), 152(f)(1)(A). Adopted children are treated as children
by blood. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(B).
76
I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B). It is this residence test that prevents noncustodial parents from
claiming the EITC. In general, the residence test, while simple enough on its face, presents major
hurdles for many low-income taxpayers. When the IRS audits a return and requests proof that a
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is an exception for noncustodial parents, but the exception does not apply for
purposes of the EITC or head of household filing status. This exception is
discussed further infra in Part III.A.5.
(3) Age Test: The dependent must be younger than the taxpayer (and
the taxpayer’s spouse if filing jointly) and be under age 19 at the close of the
year or under age 24 and a full-time student during at least five calendar
months of the year.77 There is no age limit if the dependent is permanently and
totally disabled at any time during the year.78
(4) Support Test: The dependent cannot have provided over one-half
of his or her own support during the year. 79
(5) Joint Return Test: The dependent cannot have filed a joint return
for the year, except if the return was filed solely to claim a refund.80
3. Qualifying Relative
A taxpayer may take a dependent exemption for a “qualifying relative”
who is not a “qualifying child.” 81 Having a qualifying relative also may qualify

dependent meets the residence test, the taxpayer must be able to obtain reliable, documentary
evidence from the year of the return that proves residence that spans at least a six-month period.
This documentary hurdle often proves insurmountable for families that move frequently or do not
use traditional child care. See Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, IRS, Volume Two: TAS Research &
Related Studies, 2012 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 71, 79–81 [hereinafter 2012 NTA, Study of Tax
Court Cases], available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/
Volume-2.pdf.
77

I.R.C. §§ 152(c)(1)(C), 152(3)(A). The age requirement must be met as of the “close of the
calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins.” Id. As discussed in supra note
59, this Article assumes that the tax year is the same as a calendar year. However, if the
taxpayer’s tax year is not a calendar year, taxpayers must read the requirements very carefully.
78

I.R.C. § 152(c)(3)(B). Permanently and totally disabled is defined in Code section 22(e)(3).
I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(D). This is a different standard than a requirement that the taxpayer
provide most of the dependent’s support. That was the rule prior to 2005. Measuring support can
be very tricky and proof issues loom large. Earned income and investment income earned by a
potential dependent count as the dependent providing their own support, but only if the money is
actually spent on support items. If the dependent put the money in a savings account, it would not
count toward support. See Dick v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Wis. 1963); see also
IRS, PUBLICATION 17: YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS 34 (2013) [hereinafter IRS,
PUBLICATION 17], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf. Similarly, non-needsbased Social Security benefits paid on behalf of the potential dependent (such as survivor’s
benefits) count as the dependent providing their own support if the money is actually spent on
support items. See id.; see also Rev. Rul. 57-344, 1957-2 C.B. 112. However, needs-based
support payments provided by a state, such as SNAP (food stamps), TANF (welfare), or housing
subsidies are considered support provided by the state, not the potential dependent, unless the
payments are not used for support. See IRS, PUBLICATION 17, supra, at 34; see also Lutter v.
Comm’r, 514 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1975); Rev. Rul. 71-468, 1971-2 C.B. 115. Similarly, foster
care payments by a placement agency are support provided by the agency, not the potential
dependent. Id.
79

80

I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(E).
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a taxpayer for head of household filing status. However, neither the EITC nor
the child tax credit extends to taxpayers with qualifying relatives.82 The
eligibility rules to be a qualifying relative are not directly relevant to this
Article because a qualifying relative does not support an EITC claim. Thus,
they are not explained in depth. The rules are discussed in IRS Publications 17
and 501.
4. Tie-Breaker Rules
All the child-based tax benefits must be claimed as a group; they
cannot be split among various otherwise-eligible taxpayers. 83 However,
separated parents may split some tax benefits between them. 84 For example, a
mother cannot use a child for the EITC while the father uses the same child for
the child tax credit (unless they are separated and comply with special rules).
Even if more than one taxpayer is eligible to claim a dependent, only
one may do so. 85 In these cases, special tie-breaker rules apply. When a

81

I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(D). This is really a tie-breaker rule. If a person is a qualifying child of
one taxpayer but the qualifying relative of another taxpayer, the taxpayer with the qualifying
child relationship wins. There is an important exception to this general rule. The taxpayer with
the qualifying relative relationship to the dependent can claim the dependent if the person who
has the qualifying child relationship is not required to file an income tax return (for example,
because he or she makes too little income to have a filing obligation) and if the person with the
qualifying child relationship either (1) does not actually file a return, or (2) files a return solely to
obtain a refund of withheld income taxes. IRS Notice 08-5, 2008-2 I.R.B. 256. If the person with
a qualifying child relationship files a tax return to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes and
also claims the EITC, then this rule is not triggered and the qualifying child relationship has
precedence over the qualifying relative relationship. Id.
82
There is a special rule that permits a noncustodial parent to claim a child as a qualifying
relative even if the noncustodial parent does not provide more than one-half of the potential
dependent’s support for the year. Then the qualifying relative support test is ignored if the
custodial parent has shifted the right to claim the child to the noncustodial parent, as discussed in
infra Part III.A.5. However, this rule would operate to treat a child as the qualifying relative of a
noncustodial parent, rather than as his or her qualifying child, only in unusual circumstances. For
example, it could apply when the child is too old to be a qualifying child. It also could apply
when the child provides over half of his or her own support, disqualifying him or her from being
a qualifying child. If this rule is triggered, it does not entitle the noncustodial parent to claim an
EITC based on that child.
83
IRS Notice 06-86, 2006-2 C.B. 680; IRS, PUBLICATION 501: EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD
DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION 17 (2013) [hereinafter IRS, PUBLICATION 501], available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf. There is a list of tax benefits that must be grouped
together by child. All of the tax benefits discussed in this Article fall within that list.
84
See infra Part III.A.5.
85
See IRS, PUBLICATION 501, supra note 83, at 17. When a dependent is claimed on more
than one tax return, both taxpayers are commonly audited. For example, if mom claims her child
on her tax return and so does dad, the IRS’s computers will flag the dual use of the child’s
taxpayer identification number, and both will be audited. In addition, any refund claimed by the
second-to-be-filed return typically is frozen until the audit is completed. See IRS, INTERNAL
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dependent is the qualifying child (or qualifying relative) of more than one
taxpayer, special rules decide which taxpayer may claim the dependent for
various tax purposes. 86 As discussed above, if a person is the qualifying relative
of one taxpayer and the qualifying child of another taxpayer, the taxpayer with
the qualifying-child relationship may claim the dependent.87 Sometimes the tiebreaker is needed between a parent and a non-parent. If the dependent is the
qualifying child of two or more taxpayers, one of whom is the parent, the
child’s 88 parent is allowed to claim the child.89 Effectively, an eligible parent
has a right-of-first refusal against any non-parent to claim his or her child. For
example, if a child lives with the child’s mother and grandmother, the mother is
entitled to claim the child.90 However, if an eligible parent does not claim the
child, another taxpayer may do so as long as that other taxpayer has an adjusted
gross income (“AGI”) greater than the otherwise-eligible parent.91 AGI is a tax
term of art. It is the taxpayer’s gross income as reported on his or her return
less certain “above-the-line” deductions, such as the deduction for alimony
paid, the deduction for certain tuition payments, and the deduction for one-half
of self-employment taxes. 92 Thus, in the above example where the child is
living with his or her mother and grandmother, the grandmother can claim the
child as long as (1) the mother does not do so and (2) the grandmother’s AGI is
greater than the mother’s AGI. 93
Sometimes the tie-breaker is needed between more than one eligible
non-parent. If more than one non-parent can claim the dependent as a
qualifying child, the one with the highest AGI is allowed to claim the
dependent. 94 This is true provided that either (1) the parents are not eligible to
claim the child or (2) the parents do not actually claim the child and any

REVENUE MANUAL 4.19.15.13 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-019015r.html#d0e2544.
86
For a description of some pre-2001 tie-breaker rules, see JANET HOLTZBLATT & ROBERT
REBELEIN, Measuring the Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Marriage Penalties and
Bonuses, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON
AMERICA’S FAMILIES 166, 193 n.4–5 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., Russell Sage
Found. 2001).
87

I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(D) (2014).
This Article’s examples refer to the potential dependent as the “child” because that is the
most common context in which these issues arise. Recall, however, that adults and those in a
relationship other than parent-child can be considered a “qualifying child.” See supra Part
III.A.2.
89
I.R.C. § 152(e)(4).
88

90
91
92
93
94

See IRS, PUBLICATION 501, supra note 83, at 17 ex. 3.
I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(A).
I.R.C. § 62.
See IRS, PUBLICATION 501, supra note 83, at 17 exs. 1 & 2.
I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(A).
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otherwise-eligible parent has a lower AGI than the non-parent allowed to claim
the child. 95
Sometimes the tie-breaker is needed between two parents. If more than
one parent actually claims the child as a qualifying child, then the parent with
whom the child lived longer during the year is granted the dependent. 96 For
example, if a child lives with his mother and mid-year both move into the
father’s home, the mother may claim the child because the child lived with her
longer. If the child lived with the parents an equal amount of time, then the
parent with the higher AGI is allowed to claim the child. 97
Notice that the tie-breaker rule between parents is fundamentally
different than the tie-breaker rule between non-parents. The tie-breaker rule
between non-parents compares two (or more) taxpayers who are otherwise
eligible to claim a child and determines which of them is allowed to claim the
child. They cannot agree amongst themselves who will claim the child. 98 The
rule works differently between parents. The tie-breaker rule between parents
compares two taxpayers each of whom actually attempts to claim the child. 99 In
other words, parents can agree who will claim the child; as long as only one
parent actually does claim the child, then the tax claim is valid. 100
5. Exceptions for Noncustodial Parents
An exception allows a parent who could not claim a child under the
normal rules to do so. 101 Normally, a qualifying child must live with the
taxpayer more than half of the year. 102 That means that the custodial parent
normally is allowed to claim the child, assuming that the parents live apart for
most of the year. The custodial parent is the parent who actually has custody
for the greater portion of the year.103 However, special rules allow the custodial
95
96

Id. There are excellent examples of this surprisingly complex rule in IRS Publication 501.
I.R.C. § 152(c)(4)(B).

97

Id.
See IRS, PUBLICATION 501, supra note 83, at 18 ex. 11. Of course, speaking practically, if
they make such an agreement and if only one of them actually claims the child, it would be
highly unlikely that the IRS would detect the error.
98

99
The wording is significant. The rule applies to “parents claiming any qualifying child”
whereas the non-parent tie-breaker rule applies where a child “may be claimed as the qualifying
child of another taxpayer.” I.R.C. §§ 152(c)(4)(B), 152(c)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
100
See IRS, PUBLICATION 501, supra note 83, at 18 exs. 9 & 10.
101
This rule applies to shift either qualifying child status or qualifying relative status.
However, cases where the noncustodial parent would be claiming a child as a qualifying relative
instead of as a qualifying child are rare. See supra note 82. This Article assumes the status being
shifted is that of qualifying child.
102

See infra Part III.A.2.
A court order usually suffices to demonstrate which parent has custody for more nights
during the year. However, if the parents do not follow the parenting plan, the parent who actually
103
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parent to shift the dependent exemption (and the child tax credit) to the
noncustodial parent. This is allowed when all of the following are true:
(1) the child receives over one-half of his or her support from the
child’s parents; 104
(2) the child is in the custody of one or both of the parents for more
than one-half of the year; and
(3) the child’s parents (a) are divorced or legally separated under a
decree of divorce or separate maintenance,105 (b) are separated under a written
separation agreement, or (c) live apart at all times during the last six months of
the year. 106
If these threshold criteria are satisfied, then the custodial parent can
shift the dependent exemption (and the child tax credit) to the noncustodial
parent. 107 This must be done in a very particular fashion, however. The
custodial parent must execute IRS Form 8332 and the noncustodial parent must
include the Form 8332 with his or her return.108

has custody of the child for more nights during the year is considered the custodial parent. See
IRS, PUBLICATION 504: DIVORCED OR SEPARATED INDIVIDUALS, at 8 (2013) [hereinafter IRS,
PUBLICATION 504], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p504.pdf.
104
The support rules discussed in supra note 79 apply here. Caution is needed when people or
entities other than the parents are contributing to the child’s support. Common issues arise when
grandparents or other relatives are providing cash or in-kind support or when the child is
receiving social security or needs-based benefits (which may be considered support they provide
for themselves or support provided by the state).
105

This is determined by reference to state law. Not all state court orders constitute a decree of
divorce or a decree of separate maintenance. See Frazier v. Comm’r, 638 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1981)
(an order of support and protection issued by a state court was not a legal separation under Code
section 152).
106

I.R.C. § 152(e)(1) (2014). The requirement here is that the parents live apart for the last six
months of the year, not simply for any six months or six months cumulatively.
107

Although beyond the scope of this Article and an uncommon situation, if a multiple
support agreement is required for the custodial parent to claim the child as a qualifying relative,
then the dependent exemption amount cannot be shifted to the noncustodial parent under the
special rule for “divorced” parents. I.R.C. § 152(e)(5).
108
Regulations permit a taxpayer to not use IRS Form 8332, but the substitute “must conform
to the substance of [Form 8332] and must be a document executed for the sole purpose of serving
as a written declaration under [Section 152(e)].” Special Rule for a Child of Divorced or
Separated Parents or Parents Who Live Apart, 26 C.F.R. § 1.152-4(e)(ii) (2014). Common family
court documents fail this test because they serve functions in addition to waiving the right to
claim a dependent. Thus, for all practical purposes, taxpayers are required to use IRS Form 8332.
Other scholars have noted the practical problems this presents for parents living apart. See
Nassau, supra note 14. If a court orders that the deduction be shifted to the noncustodial parent, it
is best practice to have the custodial parent execute Form 8332 before the court closes the case. If
the custodial parent refuses to execute Form 8332, the court can order him or her to do so. See
generally IRS, FORM 8332: RELEASE/REVOCATION OF RELEASE OF CLAIM TO EXEMPTION FOR
CHILD BY CUSTODIAL PARENT (2010) [hereinafter FORM 8332], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8332.pdf.
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B. Head of Household Filing Status
The Code provides more favorable tax attributes for head of household
taxpayers. 109 The head of household standard deduction is higher than the
single or married filing separately standard deduction. 110 The standard
deduction is used only if the taxpayer does not elect to itemize his or her
deductions (i.e., if the standard deduction is higher than the taxpayer’s itemized
deductions). The standard deduction reduces a taxpayer’s income, regardless of
the amount of the taxpayer’s actual expenses. Head of household filers also
enjoy more favorable tax rate brackets. 111 A taxpayer is eligible for head of
household status if the following tests are met:
(1) Considered Unmarried: The taxpayer was considered unmarried as
of the last day of the year. 112 A taxpayer is considered unmarried if (1) the
taxpayer actually is unmarried, (2) the taxpayer is separated from his or her
spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance,113 (3) the taxpayer
is married to a nonresident alien,114 (4) the taxpayer’s spouse (other than a

109

See Francine J. Lipman, Taxing Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and
Without Representation, 59 TAX LAW. 813, 842 (2006).
110
I.R.C. § 63(c)(2). For 2014, the standard deduction amounts are $12,400 for married filing
jointly, $9,100 for head of household, $6,200 for single, and $6,200 for married filing separate.
Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. There are higher amounts for taxpayers who are blind or
aged and lower amounts for taxpayers who can be claimed by someone else as a dependent.
I.R.C. §§ 63(c)(3), 63(c)(5).
111

I.R.C. § 1. In 2014, the tax brackets are as follows for single and head of household:
Bracket

Single

Head of household

10%

$0 to $9,075

$0 to $12,950

15%

$9,076 to$36,900

$12,951 to $49,400

25%

$36,901 to $89,350

$49,401 to $127,550

28%

$89,351 to $186,350

$127,551 to $206,600

33%

$186,351 to $405,100

$206,601 to $405,100

35%

$405,101 to $406,750

$405,101 to $432,200

39.6%

$406,751 and up

$432,201 and up

Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. This means that a head of household has his or her
income taxed at lower rates as compared with the single filer. For example, in 2014, a head of
household taxpayer who makes $20,000 will pay $2,352.50 in taxes, ignoring deductions, credits,
etc. [(12,950 * 10%) + ((20,000-12,950) * 15%)] whereas the same person filing as single would
pay $2,546.25 [(9,075 * 10%) + ((20,000 – 9,075) * 15%)].
112
I.R.C. § 2(b)(1).
113

This is determined by reference to state law. See supra note 105.
This is a tax concept largely unrelated to the immigration laws. An undocumented person
can be considered a resident alien for tax purposes. See supra note 70.
114
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nonresident alien) died during the year, or (5) the taxpayer lived apart from his
or her spouse for the last six months of the year. 115
(2) Maintains a Household: The taxpayer paid over one-half of the
cost of maintaining the household that year. 116
(3) Residence Test: A qualifying dependent lived with the taxpayer as
a member of the household for more than one-half of the year. 117 Generally
speaking, a qualifying child of the taxpayer satisfies this test. 118 However, if the
custodial parent signed IRS Form 8332 to shift the child to the noncustodial
parent, that shift does not allow the noncustodial parent to file as head of
household. 119 The same is true for the EITC. Qualifying relatives also may
qualify a taxpayer for head of household filing status. 120
C. Child Tax Credit and Additional Child Tax Credit
The Code provides a nonrefundable child tax credit of up to $1,000 per
child, available for low- to middle-income taxpayers, and phasing out for

115

I.R.C. §§ 2(b)(1), 2(b)(2), 2(c), 7703(b).

116

I.R.C. § 2(b)(1). The regulations explain that “[t]he cost of maintaining a household shall
be the expenses incurred for the mutual benefit of the occupants” and instructs taxpayers to
“include property taxes, mortgage interest, rent, utility charges, upkeep and repairs, property
insurance, and food consumed on the premises” but to exclude “the cost of clothing, education,
medical treatment, vacations, life insurance, and transportation.” 26 C.F.R. §1.2-2(d) (2014). It is
useful to think of the distinction between expenses for maintaining a household (such as rent) and
expenses for maintaining a person (such as clothing). IRS Publication 17 and IRS Publication
501 each provides a worksheet for determining whether or not this test is satisfied. In addition to
distinguishing between household and personal expenses, the taxpayer must identify the source
of the money used to pay the household expenses. The taxpayer must be the source of the funds
used to pay more than half of the expenses of maintaining the household. The concepts discussed
in supra note 79 regarding who is considered the source of different types of support also apply
here. For example, a taxpayer who uses TANF payments to pay the rent is not considered to have
paid that portion of the cost of maintaining the home (the state paid that portion). IRS,
PUBLICATION 501, supra note 83, at 9. By extension, a taxpayer who uses his or her own Social
Security disability payments to pay the rent is considered to have paid that portion of the cost of
maintaining the home. Few households keep their household accounts with the level of detail that
these rules seem to contemplate. Low-income taxpayers who have their head of household filing
status challenged on audit often find that providing sufficient supporting documentation is nearly
impossible due to the complexity of the rules, the passage of time, the cash nature of many of the
transactions, and the often mobile living situations of the taxpayers.
117
I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A). There is an exception to the residence test for a taxpayer entitled to a
dependent exemption for his or her parent if the taxpayer is maintaining the parent’s household.
I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(B).
118
119
120

I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i); see supra Part III.A.2.
I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i).
I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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higher-income taxpayers. 121 The child must be under age 17 by the end of the
year. 122 In addition, the child must be a qualifying child of the taxpayer, as
discussed in supra Part III.A.2. 123 Finally, the taxpayer must include on the
return the name and taxpayer identification number of the child.124
If the taxpayer does not owe enough in taxes to fully utilize the child
tax credit, the unused portion may be refunded to the taxpayer if the taxpayer’s
income falls within a certain range. 125 This is called the additional child tax
credit. There are no additional qualifying tests, other than the income range, for
the additional child tax credit.
D. Earned Income Tax Credit
The EITC is a potentially very valuable refundable tax credit. 126 If the
taxpayer owes $0 in federal income taxes,127 but has a $1,000 EITC, the IRS
will pay $1,000 to the taxpayer. In the Author’s experience, the EITC is almost
always the most important issue in an audit regarding child tax benefits of a
low-income taxpayer. If the IRS denies the other child-based tax benefits, the
taxpayer may owe money back to the IRS, but the amount is often not

121

The credit begins phasing out at $55,000 for married couples filing separately, $75,000 for
single, head of household, and qualifying widow(er) filers, and $110,000 for married couples
filing jointly. The credit is reduced by $50 for each $1,000 of income above these threshold
amounts. The point at which the credit is fully phased out depends on the number of children
claimed. I.R.C. § 24(b).
122
I.R.C. § 24(c).
123
I.R.C. § 24(a). A noncitizen who is a qualifying child by virtue of being a resident of a
country contiguous to the United States does not qualify for the child tax credit. I.R.C. §§
24(c)(2), 152(b)(3).
124
I.R.C. § 24(e). This is the social security number or, for persons not eligible for a social
security number, the individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN) issued by the IRS. ITINs
can be difficult to obtain for a variety of reasons, such as a lack of documentation from the home
country or the requirement to submit original documentation (such as an original passport) to the
IRS coupled with the long processing times taxpayers frequently experience. See Nat’l Taxpayer
Advocate, IRS, Volume One: Most Serious Problems, 2012 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 154,
available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf.
125

I.R.C. § 24(d). The refundable credit is 15% of the amount by which the taxpayer’s earned
income exceeds $3,000. Thus, the taxpayer must have at least $3,000 of earned income to qualify
for the additional child tax credit. However, if the taxpayer has three or more qualifying children,
the credit is calculated differently; in that case, the credit is the social security taxes paid by the
taxpayer less any EITC received by the taxpayer. The same income phase-out rules apply to the
additional child tax credit.
126
See Jennifer McGroarty, Note, Time for the Child Tax Credit to Grow Up: Preserving the
Credit’s Availability and Enhancing Benefits for Families, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 302, 314 (2011).
127
Just because someone owes $0 in federal income taxes does not mean that he or she has not
paid any federal taxes. Indeed, by definition, all persons entitled to the EITC are workers and
have income subject to payroll taxes.
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significant. 128 However, if the IRS denies a taxpayer’s EITC, it can create a
devastating tax debt or a crippling financial crisis. The following subparts
discuss how the EITC is calculated and the eligibility requirements to claim an
EITC.
1. The Amount of the EITC and Phase-Out Rules
The amount of the EITC is a percentage of a taxpayer’s earned income,
up to a certain dollar amount.129 The EITC starts to phase out at certain income
levels and becomes fully unavailable once a taxpayer has more than a certain
amount of AGI. 130 The interplay of these two rules means that even the smallest
amount of earned income can generate an EITC; however, there is a “sweet
spot” range of income which generates the highest credit possible without
being subject to the phase-out rules. For taxpayers in the phase-out range, the
maximum EITC is reduced by the applicable phase-out percentage multiplied
by the amount by which his or her earned income exceeds the beginning of the
phase-out range. 131
There are two versions of the EITC: one without children and one with
children. In 2014, the following applies to a taxpayer 132 without a qualifying
child: 133 The EITC for workers without qualifying children is 7.65% of the
taxpayer’s earned income, up to the maximum credit (in 2014, $496). 134 The
minimum earned income a taxpayer without qualifying children needs to

128

The child tax credit typically is the second most significant tax benefit discussed in this
Article.
129
I.R.C. § 32(a). The percentage and dollar limits vary and many of the figures are indexed
annually for inflation. In 2014, the percentage and dollar limits range from 7.65% with no
qualifying children up to $6,480 of earned income, to 34% with one qualifying child up to $9,720
of earned income, to 40% with two qualifying children up to $13,650 of earned income, to 45%
with three or more qualifying children up to $13,650 of earned income. I.R.C. §§ 32(b)(1)–(3).
Rev. Proc. 13-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
130
I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(2), (b).
131
132
133

I.R.C. § 32(a)(2).
A couple filing jointly would count as one “taxpayer” here.

The percentages used in calculating the EITC are located at Code section 32(b)(1)(A) and
are static, not changing absent legislative action. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A). The dollar figures, located
throughout Code section 32(b), are updated annually to account for changes in the cost of living,
pursuant to Code section 32(j). I.R.C. § 32(j). The updated dollar figures are released by the IRS
in a Revenue Procedure near the start of each year. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B.
537 (releasing inflation-adjusted figures for 2014). For historical figures, see TAX POL’Y CTR.,
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PARAMETERS, 1975–2014 (2014) [hereinafter EITC PARAMETERS],
available
at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/historical_eitc_para
meters.pdf.
134
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
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receive the maximum credit is $6,480. 135 This “individual-only” EITC starts to
phase out at $8,110 of AGI ($13,540 if filing jointly), phases out at 7.65%, and
becomes unavailable at $14,590 ($20,020 if filing jointly). 136 Therefore, the
“sweet spot” range of income (where the taxpayer receives the maximum credit
without being subject to a phase-out) is between $6,480 and $8,110 (for
taxpayers filing jointly between $6,480 and $14,590). Other than the phase-out
ranges, the rules are the same for single, head of household, or joint filers.137
An enhanced version of the EITC is available to taxpayers with
qualifying children. The credit gets more valuable as more children are
claimed, up to three. 138 The phase-out ranges and the minimum incomes
required to get the maximum credit also go up with each child, but only up to
two. The sweet spot range, the beginning of the phase-out range, and the phaseout percentage is the same for families with two children and families with
three children; the phase-out range extends longer for families with three
children because the phase-out percentage takes longer to completely eliminate
the maximum credit. As with the individual-only EITC, other than the phaseout ranges, the rules are the same for single, head of household, or joint
filers. 139
In 2014, the following applies to a taxpayer with one qualifying child:
The maximum credit is $3,305. 140 The credit is 34% of the taxpayer’s earned
income, up to the maximum credit. The minimum earned income the taxpayer
needs to receive the maximum credit is $9,720. 141 The credit starts to phase out
at $17,830 of AGI ($23,260 if filing jointly), phases out at 15.98%, and
becomes unavailable at $38,511 ($43,941 if filing jointly). 142
In 2014, the following applies to a taxpayer with two qualifying
children: The maximum credit is $5,460. 143 The credit is 40% of the taxpayer’s
earned income, up to the maximum credit. The minimum earned income the

135
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
136
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
137
The EITC is not available to married filing separately taxpayers.
138

The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended the provisions for families with three
or more children through tax year 2017. Pub. L. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2012).
139

The EITC is not available for married filing separately taxpayers.
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
141
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
142
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
143
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
140

figures, see EITC
figures, see EITC
figures, see EITC
figures, see EITC
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taxpayer needs to receive the maximum credit is $13,650. 144 The credit starts to
phase out at $17,830 of AGI ($23,260, if filing jointly), phases out at 21.06%,
and becomes unavailable at $43,756 ($49,186, if filing jointly). 145
In 2014, the following applies to a taxpayer with three or more
qualifying children: The maximum credit is $6,143. 146 The credit is 45% of the
taxpayer’s earned income, up to the maximum credit. The minimum earned
income the taxpayer needs to receive the maximum credit is $13,650. 147 The
credit starts to phase out at $17,830 of AGI ($23,260, if filing jointly), phases
out at 21.06%, and becomes unavailable at $46,997 ($52,427, if filing
jointly). 148
These 2014 rules can be summarized as follows:

144

I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc.
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
145
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc.
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
146
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc.
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
147
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc.
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.
148
I.R.C. § 32(b); Rev. Proc.
PARAMETERS, supra note 134.

2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. For historical figures, see EITC
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Qualifying
Children

0

Credit
Percentage

7.65%

1

34%

2

40%

3+

45%

Maximum
Credit

$496

$3,305

$5,460

$6,143

Sweet Spot
Range
$6,480–
$8,110
$6,480–
$13,540
149
(MFJ)
$9,720–
$17,830
$9,720–
$23,260
(MFJ)
$13,650–
$17,830
$13,650–
$23,260
(MFJ)
$13,650–
$17,830
$13,650–
$23,260
(MFJ)

Phase-Out
Range

25
Phase-Out
Percentage

$8,110–$14,590
$13,540–
$20,020 (MFJ)

7.65%

$17,830–
$38,511
$23,260–
$43,941 (MFJ)

15.98%

$17,830–
$43,756
$23,260–
$49,186 (MFJ)

21.06%

$17,830–
$46,997
$23,260–
$52,427 (MFJ)

21.06%

2. Definition of Earned Income
The EITC was designed to encourage low-income individuals to
work. It is a support for low-income working people and families.151 To
accomplish this, the credit is calculated as a percentage of “earned income.” 152
“Earned income” is wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation that
the taxpayer must include in income, plus the taxpayer’s net earnings from selfemployment. 153 Earned income for the EITC is determined without regard to
community property laws. 154 Pensions or annuities are not earned income,
150

149

MFJ is an abbreviation for married filing jointly.

150

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.

151
152

I.R.C. § 32(a)(1) (2014).
I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(A). Net earnings from self-employment are determined under Code
section 1402(a), but with regard to the deduction allowed to the taxpayer by Code section 164(f)
for one-half of the self-employment taxes paid. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(A)(ii).
153

154
I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(i). In community property states, earned income generally is
considered community property and is considered to be owned equally by the spouses. Even if
only one of the spouses actually did the work to generate the earned income, the non-earning
spouse is entitled (and required) to report one-half of the earned income as his or her own. 26
C.F.R. § 1.66-1 (2003). The EITC rules ignore state community property rules when allocating
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although certain disability benefits received before the taxpayer reaches
minimum retirement age are earned income. 155 Amounts received by prison
inmates for work are not earned income. 156 Nontaxable combat pay may be
taxable earned income at the taxpayer’s election. 157 IRS publications provide
many more specific examples of what qualifies as earned income for the
EITC. 158
3. EITC Requirements That All Taxpayers Must Meet
There are some general requirements that anyone must meet to claim
an EITC, with or without qualifying children, as follows:
(1) Citizenship: The taxpayer must be a United States citizen or
resident alien 159 during the entire tax year.160
(2) Social Security Numbers Valid for Employment: The taxpayer, the
taxpayer’s spouse, and any claimed qualifying children161 must have a social
security number that is valid for employment in the United States. 162
(3) Taxpayer Not a Qualifying Child: The taxpayer must not be the
qualifying child of another taxpayer. 163
(4) Limit on Investment Income: The taxpayer cannot have investment
income over a certain amount, which is indexed for inflation.164 For 2014, the
limit is $3,350. 165

earned income between spouses. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(i). Thus, only the spouse that actually
earned the income is entitled to use the earned income to claim an EITC. This can become
significant where married couples still in a valid community for community property purposes
live apart.
155

I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(ii); EITC, Earned Income Tax Credit, Questions and Answers, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/EITC,-Earned-Income-Tax-Credit,-Questions-and-Answers (last
updated Jan. 6, 2014).
156
I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(iv).
157

Id.
See, e.g., Earned Income, IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/app/eitc2012/html/en/earned_income.jsp
(last visited Sept. 5, 2014); IRS, PUBLICATION 596, EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) FOR USE IN
PREPARING 2013 RETURNS (2013) [hereinafter IRS, PUBLICATION 596], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf.
159
The term “resident alien” differs here from its usage in the context of U.S. immigration
laws. See supra note 70.
160
I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(D).
158

161
162

I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(D).
I.R.C. §§ 32(c)(1)(E)–(m).

163

I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(B).
I.R.C. § 32(i). Investment income limited under this provision is taxable interest and
dividends, non-exempt interest, net non-business income from rents or royalties, capital gain net
income, and net passive activity income. I.R.C. § 32(i)(2).
164

165

Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
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(5) No Foreign Earned Income Exclusion: The taxpayer cannot have
claimed a foreign earned income exclusion under Code section 911.166
(6) Not Filing as Married Filing Separate: The taxpayer cannot file as
married filing separate.167 All other filings statuses are allowed. 168
(7) Earned Income: The taxpayer must have earned income that falls
within the ranges discussed above.
4. Additional EITC Requirements
To claim an EITC without children, the taxpayer must (1) live in the
United States for more than one-half of the year, (2) be between ages 25 and 65
by the last day of the tax year (if the taxpayer is considered married, the
taxpayer’s spouse can satisfy the age requirement if the taxpayer does not), and
(3) not be a dependent of another taxpayer.169
To claim an enhanced EITC with qualifying children, different rules
apply. 170 The basic qualifying child requirements discussed in supra Part
III.A.2 apply to the EITC, but are modified. A qualifying child must meet the
same relationship and age tests that apply for the dependent exemption.171 In
addition, just as with the dependent exemption, a qualifying child cannot have
filed a joint return (except for returns simply requesting a refund of withheld
income taxes). 172 The EITC adds a requirement that the qualifying child not be
married as of the end of the year, unless the taxpayer is entitled to a dependent
exemption for the married child.173 The support test does not apply at all for the

166
167

I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(C).
I.R.C. § 32(d).

168

Id. This restriction is especially troublesome for low-income married people. The
economic benefit from income splitting is not very great in many low-income households, either
because both partners must work to make ends meet or because the couple already is in the
lowest tax brackets (potential marriage penalties due to tax brackets are not a concern until the
couple reaches the 28% tax bracket which in 2014 applies to joint income over $148,850).
Married couples with children face a very large incentive to file as married filing jointly in order
to claim the EITC. However, it is not uncommon for one of the spouses to be concerned about
the risk of joint and several liability; filing jointly creates joint and several liability. See Michelle
Lyon Drumbl, Decoupling Taxes and Marriage: Beyond Innocence and Income Splitting, 4
COLUM. J. TAX L. 94, 102 (2012) (“Married taxpayers must accept the risks of joint and several
liability or else sacrifice eligibility for the refundable earned income credit; choosing the latter
may mean the taxpayers forsake thousands of dollars to help support their household.”).
169
170
171
172
173

I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(B).
I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(i).
I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A).
Id.
I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(B).
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EITC; 174 there is no requirement that a taxpayer support a qualifying child
being claimed for the EITC, and there is no requirement that the child not
support himself or herself. Said differently, support is irrelevant to the EITC. A
qualifying child must meet the residence test. Significantly, the residence test is
applied without regard to the exception for noncustodial parents.175 This means
that the child must actually live with the taxpayer for more than half of the year
to claim the EITC. Finally, the taxpayer and qualifying child(ren) must live in
the United States. 176
E. Tax Arbitrage Opportunities in the Current System
The current rules enable cooperative parents to generate tax savings by
engaging in some limited tax planning. There are opportunities for tax arbitrage
because the current rules allow a custodial parent to waive the right to claim a
dependent, effectively shifting a dependent to the noncustodial parent. Tax
arbitrage means “[b]uying in one market and selling at a higher price in another
market . . . where such activity is a result of differences in taxation.” 177 In the
family context, tax arbitrage occurs when parents negotiate over who will
utilize child-based tax benefits; such benefits are almost always more valuable
to one parent than to the other.178
Consider the example discussed in the introduction. Mom has primary
custody of two children and is not working. Dad works two part-time jobs and
visits his children as often as his schedule permits. Under the current rules,
Mom has the absolute right to claim the two children for the dependent
exemption, the child tax credit, the EITC, and as the basis for head of
household filing status. She can shift to Dad the right to claim the children for
the dependent exemption and the child tax credit. These tax benefits are more
valuable to Dad than to Mom. In fact, these tax benefits are useless to Mom,
except to the extent they represent a possible tool to negotiate concessions from
Dad, such as higher child support payments. In 2014, the difference between

174
I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) (“The term ‘qualifying child’ means a qualifying child of the taxpayer
(as defined in section 152(c), determined without regard to paragraph (1)(D) thereof and section
152(e)).” (emphasis added)).
175
I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) (“The term ‘qualifying child’ means a qualifying child of the taxpayer
(as defined in section 152(c), determined without regard to paragraph (1)(D) thereof and section
152(e)).” (emphasis added)).
176
177

I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(C).
Simon James, Tax Arbitrage, in DICTIONARY OF TAXATION 249, 249 (2d ed. 2012).

178
See generally Reginald Mombrun, Shifting the Paradigm by Bringing Tax Arbitrage to the
Lower Income Separated Family: Why Should the Middle to Upper Class Family Have All the
Fun?, 26 AKRON TAX J. 107 (2011).
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Mom claiming the children versus allowing Dad to claim the children can be
summarized as follows: 179
CUSTODIAL MOM
NONCUSTODIAL DAD
IF MOM USES CHILD-BASED TAX BENEFITS:
Income
$0
$20,000
Less standard
deduction
($9,100) (HOH) 180
($6,200) (single)
($11,850) (3 persons)
Less exemptions
($3,950) (1 person)
$0
Taxable income
$9,850
$0
Tentative tax
$1,023.75 181
($0)
($0)
Less child tax credit
($0)
$0
Tax
Less additional child
($0)
($0)
tax credit
($0) 182
($0)
Less EITC
Tax owed
$0
$1,023.75
IF DAD USES CHILD-BASED TAX BENEFITS:
Income
$0
$20,000
Less standard
deduction
($9,100) (HOH)
($6,200) (single)
Less exemptions
($3,950) (1 person)
($11,850) (3 persons)
Taxable income
$0
$1,950
Tentative tax
$0
$195
Less child tax credit
($0)
($195)
Tax
$0
$0
Less additional child
tax credit
($0)
($1,805)
Less EITC
($0)
($0)
Tax owed
$0
($1,805) [refund]
Change in Tax
Liability
$0
$2,828.75

179
This chart is adapted from a similar chart used in Walter Adams Looney III, Trading Tax
Benefits for Child Support, Essays on Tax and Social Policy, (May 25, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author). The facts and calculations are the work of
the Author, however, and are based on 2014 figures.
180
HOH is an abbreviation for head of household filing status.
181
This tax is calculated using the applicable tax bracket: ($9,075 * 10%) + (($9,850-$9,075)
* 15%). The actual tax would be calculated using tax tables published by the IRS, which were
not available as this Article went to press. The amounts may vary slightly due to rounding in the
tax tables.
182
Dad would be eligible for the EITC for a childless worker except that he makes too much
earned income. In 2014, this EITC is fully phased out for incomes above $14,590. Rev. Proc. 1335, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
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If Mom shifts the child-based tax benefits to Dad, her tax situation does
not change, but his improves. Not only does he avoid a $1,023.75 tax bill, but
he generates a refund of $1,805. Dad gets a total tax benefit of $2,828.75. Mom
can negotiate with Dad and require him to share some or all of the “savings”
with her. This example is a very clear demonstration of how tax arbitrage
benefits Mom. If she had some income, however, her taxes would go up if she
shifts the children to Dad. This would need to be considered as part of the
negotiation. 183
IV.

ANALYZING THE CURRENT RULES

Given our understanding of the policy goals of the EITC and how the
Code currently functions, the next step is to determine how well the rules
function. This part looks at the EITC rules through the lens of some traditional
measures of tax policy. First, this part looks at horizontal equity and vertical
equity, asking whether similarly situated taxpayers are treated similarly and
whether the burdens of taxation rest more greatly with those possessing a
greater ability to pay. Next, this part looks at how efficient the current EITC
rules are, both in terms of cost to the government and cost to the taxpayer.
Then, the Article critically analyzes whether the current rules actually advance
the policy goals of the EITC. Finally, this part looks at neutrality issues, or
whether the EITC rules cause people to alter their behavior in an unintended
manner.
A. Equity
1. Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is one of the main tools economists use to analyze
the fairness of a tax. Horizontal equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers
bear similar tax burdens. 184 The EITC, because it is administered as part of the
income tax system, should satisfy principles of horizontal equity. Notice that
the EITC itself violates horizontal equity. A single taxpayer with $10,000 of
wages will generate an EITC, while the exact same taxpayer with $10,000 of
capital gain, or pension, or unemployment income does not generate an EITC.
Congress has determined that this non-uniform system of taxation is justified
by policy considerations. For example, the EITC is touted for its ability to

183

For a more thorough discussion of the different ways to divide the net gain from the trade,
see Mombrun, supra note 178, at 141–42.
184
See John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation, Repeal, Restructuring and
Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 545 (1993).
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incentivize work among the lowest paid,185 and this policy benefit arguably
offsets the violations of horizontal equity. 186 In addition, the EITC was
designed to offset payroll taxes for low-wage workers; 187 thus, the non-uniform
distinction between earned income (which is subject to payroll taxes) and nonearned income (which is not subject to payroll taxes) is justified by the policy
objectives of the EITC.
However, horizontal equity principles should apply to treat equally
those who are in equal positions and who could be eligible for the credit.
Among those toward whom the credit is targeted (low-wage workers with
families), 188 are equals treated equally? When the horizontal equity question is
posed this way, the answer is a vigorous no. To illustrate why, it is useful to
consider a series of scenarios that involve different types of families. For the
sake of brevity and clarity, this Article assigns a name to each type of family
compared. The Article looks at different scenarios for each family, but
compares these same three types of families with respect to each scenario.
The “Married Couple”: A married couple who lives together and has
children who live with them.
The “Cohabiting Couple”: A couple who is not married but who lives
together. They have children who live with them.
The “One Home Family”: A “Married Couple” or a “Cohabiting
Couple.” In both cases, the couple lives together.
The “Two Home Family”: A couple who has children together. They
are not married (whether divorced or never married) 189 and do not live together.
Their children live with one of them.

185
See supra Part II for a discussion of work incentives as an important legislative purpose of
the EITC.
186
See Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case For Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 105
(1996) (“For example, under current law, the earned income tax credit provides non-uniform tax
treatment for labor and capital income of working parents. The incentive effects of this provision
on encouraging work are complex and must be considered in conjunction with other taxes and
welfare programs. It would be a mistake, however, to reject a proposal like the earned income tax
credit because it may violate some concepts of horizontal equity.”); see also Dennis J. Ventry,
Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1261, 1270
(2007).
187
See supra Part II for a discussion of payroll offsets as an important legislative purpose for
the EITC.
188
Recall that it was not until 1993 that a small credit was added for low-wage workers
without qualifying children. See supra note 38. The EITC is clearly targeted to this population as
well as to low-wage workers with children, although to a much lesser extent. However, this
Article is mainly concerned with inequities in the system as between different types of EITCeligible families with children. Therefore, this Article does not include EITC workers without
children in its equity analysis.
189

Or considered unmarried in accordance with Code section 7703. I.R.C. § 7703 (2014).
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Two-Earner Families

Many scholars have written about the anti-marriage incentives of the
EITC, 190 and these incentives seem to be creeping into the general public
consciousness as well. 191 To illustrate the potential anti-marriage effect of the
EITC, consider two hypothetical families. Assume each family has two
children and that each parent earns $10,000 (a two-children, two-earner
family). A two-children, two-earner “Cohabiting Couple” can each file as
single and claim one child each on their returns. This is because both children
are “qualifying children” with respect to each parent, primarily because there is
no separate support test for the EITC and each child meets the residence test
with respect to each parent. Furthermore, the tie-breaker rules allow parents to
agree who will claim the children for the EITC. 192 Using 2014 figures, each
parent in the “Cohabiting Couple” will generate a $3,305 EITC, $6,610 for the
family unit. A two-children, two-earner “Married Couple” would generate only
a single $5,460 EITC. This is because it is impossible to divide the children
between two tax returns that include the EITC when the parents are married.
Married Couples may file a joint return that would include both children. The
only other filing option for married couples is married filing separately.
However, married filing separately taxpayers are not eligible for the EITC.193
This $1,150 inequity between Married Couples and Cohabiting Couples
violates horizontal equity.
Horizontal equity also is violated when comparing parents who live
together (One Home Families) and parents who do not live together (Two

190

See Frederick J. Bradshaw, IV, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Marriage Penalty:
New Proposals in Light of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 54
TAX LAW. 701, 701 (2001) (“Although the marriage penalty affects taxpayers across the
economic spectrum, it most severely affects low-income couples. Congress designed the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) to benefit the working poor, but both the EITC phase-out ranges and
certain qualification rules generate a most egregious marriage penalty that still plagues lowincome families today.”); Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But
Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 806 (2005) (“The EITC is granted to individual taxpayers, but
there is a requirement that married individuals file joint returns. The effect of these rules is an
enormous marriage penalty on the working poor because the phase-out often eliminates the EITC
when both spouses’ incomes are included on their joint return.”); Ann F. Thomas, Marriage and
the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A Primer and Legislative Scorecard, 16
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 25 (1999) (“Unusually severe marriage penalties can occur in
connection with the earned income tax credit.”).
191
See, e.g., David John Marotta, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Punishes Marriage,
FORBES.COM (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2013/01/20/earnedincome-tax-credit-eitc-punishes-marriage/.
192
See supra Part III.A.4.
193
See supra Part III.D.3. In certain situations, the Code treats married couples as not married.
See supra note 67. This Article analyzes these families as either Cohabiting Couple or Two
Home Families, depending on their living situation.
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Home Families). Continue with the same facts as above (two-children, twoearner families making $10,000 each). In a Two Home Family, only the
custodial parent 194 can claim the EITC because of the residence test. 195 The
Two Home Family generates $20,000 of family-unit income; however, because
only the custodial parent can claim the EITC, the credit is based on only
$10,000 of income. Using 2014 figures, the custodial parent would generate a
$4,000 EITC. 196 On an individual basis, this is higher than the amount any
single taxpayer can generate in the One Home Families ($3,305 for each
individual in the Cohabiting Couple and $2,730 for each individual in the
Married Couple). However, on a family-unit basis, the Two Home Family
generates a lower EITC ($4,000) than either of the One Home Families ($5,460
for the Married Couple and $6,610 for the Cohabiting Couple). This is despite
the fact that each of the families has the exact same amount of income. This is a
dramatic violation of horizontal equity principles.
Change the numbers slightly and a different horizontal equity problem
emerges. Assume that each parent has $15,000 of earned income; that is
$30,000 per family. The Two Home Family will have $30,000 of family
income, but only $15,000 will count toward the EITC. The Two Home Family
will generate the maximum EITC for two qualifying children, $5,460, without
being subject to a phase-out. The Married Couple, on the other hand, is subject
to a phase-out because the full $30,000 of their family income is counted
toward the EITC. Therefore, what would normally be the Married Couple’s
EITC of $5,460 is reduced by $1,419.44 to $4,040.56. 197
Mathematically speaking, this effect will always be true because of the
EITC’s structure. If a Two Home Family with two earners and two children
generates the maximum credit of $5,460, a similar Married Couple will
experience a partial phase-out of their maximum credit of $5,460198 and a
194

This example assumes that the same custody arrangement applies to all of the couple’s
children. Therefore, only one of the two parents will be considered the custodial parent for all of
the couple’s children. The results would be different if one parent is the custodial parent of some
of the children and the other parent is the custodial parent of the other children.
195
See supra Part III.D.4.
196

A taxpayer with two qualifying children receives a credit of 40% of their earned income
(here $10,000), up to $5,460. A taxpayer with $10,000 of earned income is not affected by the
phase-outs. Our taxpayer could generate up to $1,460 of additional credit by having up to $7,830
of additional earned income.
197

The phase-out amount is 21.06% of the amount by which earned income exceeds the start
of the phase-out range. The calculation is [21.06% * ($30,000 - $23,260) = $1,419.44].
198

This is because, to generate the maximum credit, a Two Home Family with two equal
earners must have family-unit income of between $27,300 and $35,660, putting the custodial
parent with an EITC-eligible income of between $13,650 and $17,830 (the sweet spot range). If
the Married Couple has the same family-unit income, also divided evenly between two earners,
all of that family-unit income is used in calculating the EITC. This range of income (between
$27,300 and $35,660) puts the Married Couple in the phase-out range. See supra Part III.D.1 for
the chart summarizing the sweet spot and phase-out ranges.

34

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

similar Cohabiting Couple will generate their maximum credit of $6,610. 199 If a
Married Couple with two earners and two children generates the maximum
credit of $5,460, a similar Two Home Family will fall short of their maximum
credit of $5,460 200 and a similar Cohabiting Couple will generate an EITC of
between $4,641 and $6,610. 201
ii. One-Earner Families
When only one spouse works, the Code often provides a marriage
bonus or incentive. A Married Couple with two children making $20,000, but
with only one wage earner, generates a single $5,460 EITC (the same as a
Married Couple with two children and two earners). 202 However, a Cohabiting
Couple with two children and one earner sees a partial phase-out of the
maximum credit and will receive only a $5,003 EITC 203 (compared with $6,610

199

This is because if a Two Home Family has custodial-parent income that puts them in the
sweet spot range (between $13,650 and $17,830), that means the family-unit income is double.
The Cohabiting Couple, like the Two Home Family, has the same level of individual and familyunit income and is also filing separate returns; however, the Cohabiting Couple can split the
children between returns. Therefore, they each claim an EITC based on one qualifying child. An
individual level of income of between $13,650 and $17,830 means that each parent of a
Cohabiting Couple generates a maximum one-qualifying child credit of $3,305, or $6,610 for the
family unit.
200
This is because, to generate the maximum credit, a Married Couple must have between
$13,650 and $23,260 in income (in 2014). If the Two Home Family has the same family income,
also divided evenly between two earners, the EITC rules dictate that only half of that family-unit
income will be used to calculate the EITC (the income earned by the custodial parent). That level
of EITC-eligible income (between $6,825 and $11,630) puts the Two Home Family below the
sweet spot range. See supra Part III.D.1 for the chart summarizing the sweet spot and phase-out
ranges.
201
For tax year 2014 and assuming two children, if the Married Couple has family-unit
income that puts them in the sweet spot range (between $13,650 and $23,260), then each
taxpayer in a Cohabiting Couple will have between $6,825 and $11,630 of income. Each
taxpayer in a Cohabiting Couple can claim one of the couple’s two children so they will calculate
the EITC based on one qualifying child. That level of income, even with the ability to split the
children, can put the Cohabiting Couple short of generating a maximum EITC, although at the
higher end of the range, the Cohabiting Couple is in their sweet spot. Each will generate an EITC
equal to 34% of his or her earned income up to the maximum credit, or between $2,320.50
($6,825 * 34%) and $3,305. That means a total family-unit EITC of between $4,641 and $6,610.
The Cohabiting Couple comes out worse than the Married Couple at the lower end of the income
range, but comes out better at the higher end of the income range.
202
This Married Couple is in the sweet spot for an EITC based on two qualifying children if
they file jointly. See supra Part III.D.1.
203
A Cohabiting Couple typically files two tax returns. In unusual cases, one may be able to
claim the other as a dependent. In our example, there is only one taxpayer with earned income.
To obtain the maximum EITC, the partner with the earned income will claim both children on
either a single or head of household return. The maximum credit (here $5,460) is reduced by the
phase-out. The phase-out amount is the phase-out percentage (here 21.06%) multiplied by the
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for a Cohabiting Couple with two children and two earners). At this income
level and with only one earner, couples are incentivized to marry. This problem
of marriage bonuses and penalties is not only a problem with the EITC’s
structure but also a side effect of allowing married couples to file jointly. 204
The most egregious penalty of all is experienced by the Two Home
Family with only one wage earner. If the custodial parent is the wage earner,
the Two Home Family will replicate the EITC of a one-earner Cohabiting
Couple. 205 However, if the custodial parent is not the wage earner, the Two
Home Family is not eligible for an EITC at all. This happens because (1) the
custodial parent is the taxpayer normally eligible for an EITC because of the
residence test, 206 (2) the custodial parent’s EITC is $0 because he or she has no
earned income, 207 (3) the noncustodial parent has earned income but is not
eligible to claim the child-based EITC because he or she does not meet the
residence test,208 and (4) current law does not allow the custodial parent to shift
the child-based EITC to the noncustodial parent in the same manner as he or
she could shift the dependent exemption or the child tax credit.209 The Two
Home Family with one wage earner that is the noncustodial parent experiences
a complete forfeiture of the EITC. This happens solely because of the personal
decisions they have made about custody of their children and living
arrangements. This is an egregious violation of horizontal equity.
2. Vertical Equity
“Vertical equity” requires that taxpayers who are not similarly situated
bear tax burdens relative to their respective abilities to pay. 210 Is it possible that
the differences in horizontal equity noted above are justified based on
differences in the families’ ability to pay (i.e., are justified under vertical equity

amount by which the taxpayer’s earned income (here $20,000) exceeds the start of the phase-out
range (here $17,830). So the phase-out is $457 [($20,000 - $17,830) * 21.06%].
204
For an excellent exposition of marriage penalty and bonus issues, see Bradshaw, supra
note 185 (proposing two alternatives to fixing the marriage penalties of the EITC: (1) eliminating
joint returns coupled with a federal legislation addressing the different impacts community and
common law property schemes have on federal income taxation or (2) eliminating the ability to
divide qualifying children in a single household between returns coupled with a doubling of the
EITC phase-out ranges for couples filing jointly).
205

Just as with a one-earner Cohabiting Couple, the custodial parent will claim both children
on a single or head of household return. The noncustodial parent will file a single return. The
custodial parent’s return looks just like the return of the earner in the Cohabiting Couple: $20,000
of earned income, subject to a partial phase-out, with a resulting EITC of $5,003.
206
207
208
209
210

See supra Part III.D.4.
See supra Part III.D.2.
See supra Part III.D.4.
See supra Part III.D.4.
See Donaldson, supra note 184, at 545.
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principles)? Each family is generating the same income in our examples.
However, a One Home Family should have a higher ability to pay taxes (or to
forego a refundable credit) than a Two Home Family because of the economies
of scale inherent in maintaining a single household versus maintaining two
separate households. In our examples, however, a Cohabiting Couple almost
always generates a higher credit than the other families. This violates vertical
equity with respect to a Two Home Family; the Cohabiting Couple has a
greater ability to pay and should, under vertical equity, generate a lower credit.
It also violates vertical equity with respect to a Married Couple because, in
theory, both a Married Couple and a Cohabiting Couple have the same ability
to pay and should generate equal credits.
The vertical equity equation is murkier when comparing Two Home
Families and Married Couples. The Married Couple has a greater ability to pay
and sometimes the Married Couple does generate a lower credit (like in our
$15,000 example). However, in other scenarios, the Two Home Family
generates a lower credit (like in our $10,000 example). These differences
cannot be explained by vertical equity principles; the families’ respective
abilities to pay do not change so dramatically just by adding $5,000 of
additional income per parent. Thus, the current system violates vertical equity.
3. Actual Impact on Marriage Decisions
Somewhat surprisingly, studies show the Code’s marriage incentives
and disincentives have little actual impact on taxpayers’ decisions regarding
living arrangements, measured on a macro level.211 Social scientists have had
great difficulty coming to a consensus on this issue, however, in large part
because it is difficult to estimate and control for other lifestyle changes that
often accompany decisions to change living arrangements.212 For example, the
decision to marry, divorce, or live apart can influence decisions regarding
whether to work, not work, work less, or to have children, and those decisions
have a corresponding impact on taxes owed. Intriguingly, the EITC as a subset
of all tax effects has been estimated to have a greater impact on marriage
decisions than non-EITC tax effects or effects in other social welfare

211
Bruce D. Meyer, The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Recent Reforms, in 24
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 153, 170 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11973.pdf.
212
David T. Ellwood, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms
on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1063, 1090 (2000), available at
http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax/ntjrec.nsf/53542C9468D27BA085256AFC007F39D9/$FILE/v53n4p210
63.pdf.
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programs. 213 As a group, however, it appears that taxpayers seem to base their
decisions to marry, divorce, or cohabit primarily on factors other than tax costs.
On a macro level, this makes some sense because the EITC has both
incentives and disincentives to marriage and divorce which can change as the
circumstances of taxpayers’ lives change. On average, the effect on marriage
may well be neutral. On a micro level, however, these effects can loom large in
the lives of taxpayers. At least anecdotally, the Author can attest through her
work in a law school clinic that individuals often do take the EITC into
account, along with many other factors, when making important life decisions
regarding marriage and divorce. Admittedly, it is highly likely that
unrepresented and less-informed taxpayers do this with less frequency.
At any rate, the mere existence of the structural inequities is a problem
from a tax policy perspective. 214 Politicians and pundits use marriage penalties
to argue for a reduction in EITC benefits, and such arguments are emotionally
persuasive to many. 215 Even if the incentives do not greatly impact taxpayers’
actual marriage decisions prospectively, taxpayers experience and take notice
of changes in their EITC outcomes retrospectively, following changes in their
living situations. A couple who decides to marry in spite of a disincentive to
marry will notice the decrease in their EITC when they file their next tax
return. A couple who divorces in spite of an incentive to stay married will also
notice their sometimes precipitous EITC decrease. These actual results lead to a
perception that the rules are unfair, because indeed they are.
B. Efficiency
Efficiency traditionally is judged by analyzing a rule’s indirect and
direct costs. Indirect costs are costs to taxpayers for attempting to comply with
the law, and direct costs are costs to the government for administering the
law. 216 This subpart examines these costs with respect to the EITC in general
and the custodial-parents-only rule in particular.
1. The EITC in General
Indirect costs to taxpayers for complying with the current EITC rules
are high. Despite a plethora of educational material regarding eligibility
requirements for the various dependent tax benefits, the rules remain difficult to

213

Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Tax and Transfer Policy, and Family Formation: Marriage
and
Cohabitation
(Dec.
2000)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/noe/cohabitation_paper.pdf.
214
See Ellwood, supra note 212, at 1100–01.
215

See, e.g., Marotta, supra note 191.
See Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 395, 409–29 (1987).
216
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navigate, 217 especially for taxpayers in non-traditional relationships. 218 Most
taxpayers find they need professional assistance to correctly file their taxes,
especially if they fall outside the “normal” situation. 219 In addition, taxpayers
claiming an EITC face higher audit rates220 and often are uniquely poorly suited
to participate meaningfully in the IRS’s audit and appeal process. 221
The cost to the government in administering the current rule (the direct
costs) also is very high. The more complex and counterintuitive a tax rule is,
the higher the cost will be to administer it. The government bears the cost of
educating taxpayers regarding these complex rules, developing forms and
instructions that accommodate the rules, and programming its computers and
training its employees to handle the rules accurately. The government also must
expend resources to audit taxpayers and defend the results in court.

217

Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the
Hole in the Antipoverty Purse, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 461, 464 (2003) (“Even experienced certified
public accountants have stated that preparing a tax return claiming the EITC is more challenging
than completing a Form 1040 with itemized deductions.”).
218
Just as one example, while IRS Publication 596 (regarding the EITC) makes it relatively
clear that noncustodial parents cannot claim the EITC (if a taxpayer is diligent enough to read
through to page 20 and can parse the language which scores a grade 11 on the Flesch-Kincaid
readability index), neither IRS Form 8332 nor its instructions (the form that custodial parents use
to transfer the right to claim children to noncustodial parents) contains an explanation that the
transfer is not valid for the EITC. See IRS, PUBLICATION 596, supra note 158; FORM 8332, supra
note 108. Based on the Author’s experience in an EITC program, the average taxpayer is unlikely
to get the right result without an unusual display of diligence. Given the dollar amounts involved
in an erroneous EITC claim, it seems that the IRS should specifically address the EITC in very
clear language in all its publications and forms.
219
About 70% of all tax returns with an EITC are filed by commercial tax preparers.
PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM OPTIONS:
SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 3 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf.
Disturbingly, in 1999 approximately 70% of EITC overclaims were attributable to returns
prepared by paid preparers. Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, IRS, Volume Two: Research and Related
Studies, 2009 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 96, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/
09_tas_arc_vol_2.pdf. This statistic demonstrates how complex the EITC is.
220
See Zelenak, Tax or Welfare?, supra note 10, at 1875 (noting that EITC enforcement
efforts are stricter than enforcement of other tax provisions, but far less strict than enforcement of
non-tax cash transfer programs, and concluding that perhaps this is a “price worth paying” for the
survival of the EITC).
221
See Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81
OR. L. REV. 351 (2002) (discussing the unique barriers that low-income taxpayers face when
dealing with the IRS audit and appeal process).

2014]

EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PORTABILITY

39

2. Indirect Costs of the Custodial-Parent-Only Rule
There understandably is far less empirical research about the rule that
limits the EITC to custodial parents (“Custodial-Parent-Only Rule”) than exists
for the EITC generally. The indirect costs to the noncustodial parent in
complying with the rule are higher than the indirect costs generally for
taxpayers to comply with the EITC rules. The government has even recognized
the high compliance burden on divorced and separated parents.222
The high compliance burden results primarily because the rules are not
consistent regarding when a noncustodial parent may use his or her child to
claim tax benefits. With a valid Form 8332 signed by a custodial parent, a
noncustodial parent may claim the dependent exemption and the child tax
credit, but not the EITC or head of household status. This is not stated at all on
the face of Form 8332. Form 8332 speaks only in terms of “release of claim to
exemption.” 223 The form’s instructions (which are part of the form itself and
not a separate document) do explain that signing the “release of the exemption
will also allow the noncustodial parent to claim the child tax credit and the
additional child tax credit (if either applies).” 224 However, neither the form nor
its instructions contain any warning or guidance regarding the effect of signing
the form on the ability to claim the EITC. 225 The noncustodial parent could
(and often does) mistakenly believe that he or she is entitled to claim the child
for all purposes under the Code. 226
This mistaken belief is probably bolstered because it comports with the
general rule. Normally, if the person entitled to claim the child does not claim a
particular tax benefit, that does not allow another person to use the child for

222

See PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 219, at 22 (“The rules
pertaining to divorced and separated parents are particularly complex and dissimilar to the rules
that apply to other parents.”).
223
224
225

FORM 8332, supra note 108.
Id.

Id.
See Nassau, supra note 15, at 85–86 n.13 (“In the author’s experience, having represented
dozens of taxpayers with tax controversies relating to eligibility for child-based tax benefits, it is
apparent that many taxpayers and even some family law attorneys, are unaware: (a) that only
two—and which two—of the four child-based tax benefits are transferable from the Custodial
Parent to the Noncustodial Parent; and (b) that the Internal Revenue Service has very specific
rules—and what those rules are—that must be followed if such intended transfer is to be
respected.”); see also PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 219, at 22
(“The rule also reduces EITC compliance because noncustodial parents who claim the child tax
credit and other benefits may also intentionally or erroneously claim the EITC as well.”).
Professor Book has suggested that the EITC has a structural incentive for noncustodial parents
(and others significantly involved in children’s lives, but not in a traditional relationship to
children) to intentionally misstate their eligibility for an EITC as a way to redress perceived
inequities in the system. Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1163, 1177–78 (2007).
226
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that unclaimed tax benefit. 227 In other words, taxpayers cannot agree to split the
tax benefits related to a single child between them—except in the case of
divorced or separated parents.228 It seems clear that, especially in the case of
divorced or separated parents, professional assistance will be necessary to
accurately file tax returns. This is an especially unfortunate feature for a credit
targeted to low-income taxpayers. 229
When the IRS suspects that a taxpayer is not entitled to a claimed
EITC, it frequently will freeze the EITC portion of the taxpayer’s refund while
it audits the return. 230 The process can take months (sometimes years if Tax
Court litigation is involved). 231 Meanwhile, the taxpayer is denied a critical
component of annual household income. 232
Apart from possibly doing without much-needed money as a result of a
frozen EITC, there is a high cost to taxpayers from defending themselves in an

227

IRS, PUBLICATION 501, supra note 83, at 17.
In the Author’s experience, this aspect of the current rules is quite widely misunderstood,
not only among taxpayers, but among lawyers. Anecdotally, it appears that the common
understanding is that the tax benefits for a child are non-divisible and that those tax benefits
accrue to the person providing the most support for the child. Indeed, pre-2005 law was closer to
this common understanding. See Nassau, supra note 15, at 99–100. This is an area ripe for an
empirical study.
229
The IRS has long supported access to free tax preparation services for low-income
taxpayers through its Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) and Tax Counseling for the
Eldery (TCE) programs. For the 2012 filing season, the IRS awarded $12 million in grants to 213
VITA organizations in all 50 states. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REP. NO. 201240-049, ADDITIONAL STEPS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE VOLUNTEER INCOME TAX ASSISTANCE
GRANT PROGRAM REACHES MORE UNDERSERVED TAXPAYERS (2012), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201240049fr.html. In 2011, VITA sites
prepared over one million returns. Id. In addition, the IRS has partnered with tax software
companies to provide free access to tax preparation software to low-income taxpayers. See Free
File, IRS, http://www.freefile.irs.gov/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). Despite these efforts, which
should be applauded and encouraged, there is no substitute for ensuring that taxpayers can
comply without professional assistance, unless there is a policy reason that justifies the
complexity.
228

230

EITC refunds frequently are frozen when an audit happens as part of the return processing
stage. Megan Newman, The Income-Tax Gap: The Hybrid Nature of the Earned Income Tax
Credit Leads to Its Exclusion from Due Process Protection, 64 TAX LAW. 719 (2011).
231
2012 NTA, Study of Tax Court Cases, supra note 76, at 74 (“The study found that
taxpayers often had to wait almost a year and a half to receive the EITC refunds to which they
were entitled.”).
232

If the EITC were typically used to bolster savings or for longer-term financial goals, such a
delay would be frustrating, but not especially problematic. However, the lowest-income
taxpayers typically use their EITC refunds for everyday necessities, like paying rent and utilities
or buying clothes or food. Higher-income taxpayers commonly use their EITC refunds for other
urgent needs, like car repairs or replacing broken appliances. See Newman, supra note 230; see
also 2012 NTA, Study of Tax Court Cases, supra note 76, at 74 (“For more than half the
taxpayers, the claimed EITC represented more than a quarter of their adjusted gross incomes.”).
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audit process they frequently do not understand and find difficult to navigate. 233
Apart from the customary monetary “costs,” a taxpayer facing an EITC audit
faces an array of other costs. The person may decide to hire professional help,
meaning they likely are foregoing other important uses for the money, like a
visit to the doctor, fresh produce, or school supplies for their children. The
person often must take time off work234 or find child care in order to visit the
attorney’s office or go to the bank to ask for statements or go to a state office to
get records regarding assistance payments received. The increased financial
stress and uncertainty produced by the audit may actually affect the person’s
cognitive abilities, making it even harder to hold down a job, juggle financial
priorities, or be successful in school. 235
Even with the burdens that EITC audits impose on families already
burdened by poverty, society may deem that an acceptable price to be paid for
accuracy. However, there is strong evidence that the IRS’s audit process does
not produce more accurate results. While the majority of taxpayers respond to
IRS correspondence asking for EITC documentation, 236 approximately 70% of
taxpayers do not respond at all or respond “inadequately.” 237 Taxpayers
typically want to produce the documentation needed, but have trouble
understanding the request.238 Before her appointment, Nina Olson, the National
Taxpayer Advocate, estimated that approximately 25% of credits disallowed by
the IRS are disallowed in error because taxpayers are not capable of navigating

233
See Schneller et al., supra note 58, at 178 (noting that the “system is uniquely challenging
to low-income taxpayers who may lack the skills required to navigate the tax return and audit
processes”).
234
Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, IRS, Volume Two: Taxpayer Advocate Service Research Studies
and Reports, 2007 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 106 [hereinafter 2007 NTA, EITC Audit Study],
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/arc_2007_vol_2.pdf (20.9% of survey respondents
reported taking time off work to gather requested documentation).
235
Poverty already causes cognitive ability to decrease, equivalent to 13 IQ points. See Emily
Badger, How Poverty Taxes the Brain, CITYLAB (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/08/how-poverty-taxes-brain/6716/.
236
2007 NTA, EITC Audit Study, supra note 234, at 95 (over 90% of taxpayers contacted the
IRS about the audit).
237
Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 221, at 390–91.
238
2007 NTA, EITC Audit Study, supra note 234, at 103–04. This matches the Author’s
experience helping low-income taxpayers defend their EITC claims before the IRS. Taxpayers
the Author has worked with commonly misunderstand the purpose for the documentation
request. For example, if the IRS questions the residency requirement, the IRS letter suggests that
the taxpayer submit school records. Commonly, the taxpayer will submit school records for the
current year rather than the relevant tax year, or will submit school records lacking the child’s
address. The IRS then sends a generic letter stating that the records were insufficient, but not
explaining why. The taxpayer is left highly confused. Some trustingly accept they are not
eligible, even though in reality they are. Such taxpayers often forgo future EITC claims. Some
enter into installment agreements to repay a debt that they should not owe. Only the most intrepid
seek out assistance from the Taxpayer Advocate Service or a Low Income Taxpayer Clinic.
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the audit and appeal process.239 The studies that the National Taxpayer
Advocate’s Office has performed since then support her assertion that a
meaningful percentage of EITC denials are erroneous. The National Taxpayer
Advocate reported in her 2004 Annual Report to Congress that EITCs that were
initially denied on audit were restored 45% of the time when the taxpayer was
assisted by the Taxpayer Advocate Service through the audit reconsideration
process. 240 In her 2007 Annual Report to Congress, the National Taxpayer
Advocate noted that represented taxpayers are almost twice as likely to retain
their EITC during the audit process compared to unrepresented taxpayers and
that over 40% of all represented taxpayers retained their full EITC after an
audit compared with less than one in four unrepresented taxpayers who kept
their full EITC. 241 It seems clear that access to representation dramatically
affects the likelihood that a taxpayer’s EITC will be fully allowed. In other
words, many taxpayers who lose their EITC audits may actually be entitled to
the EITC but simply are failing at the audit process. 242 This imposes enormous
costs on the taxpayers as well as the government and society in general.
3. Direct Costs of the Custodial-Parent-Only Rule
The direct costs to the government in administering the CustodialParent-Only Rule are high. This is largely due to the difficulty that divorced
and separated parents face in filing accurate returns. In some cases, the problem
is easy for the IRS to detect. A taxpayer who filed a Form 8332 and also
claimed an EITC likely did so improperly; if the child listed on Form 8332 is
the same child listed on Schedule EIC, then the taxpayer clearly did something
wrong on the return. In other cases, the problem is harder to detect. For
example, a noncustodial parent may fail to file Form 8332 (intentionally,
inadvertently, or through misunderstanding) and simply claim the child on the

239
Id.; Sheryl Stratton et al., EITC Error Rates Up; Review Process Slows Down, 89 TAX
NOTES 28, 30 (2000).
240
Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, IRS, Volume Two: Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Audit
Reconsideration Study, 2004 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 9 [hereinafter 2004 NTA, Audit
Reconsideration Study], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/nta2004arcvol2interactive.pdf.
241
2007 NTA, EITC Audit Study, supra note 234, at 96.
242
This dynamic also appears in later stages of EITC controversies. The National Taxpayer
Advocate examined the number of EITC claims granted during Tax Court settlements and
through audit reconsiderations and determined the numbers are inconsistent with initial audits
designed to obtain accurate results. 2004 NTA, Audit Reconsideration Study, supra note 240, at i
(“The study empirically demonstrates that 43 percent of taxpayers who sought reconsideration of
audits that disallowed the EITC in whole or in part received additional EITC as a result of the
audit reconsideration. Where the taxpayer received additional EITC, he or she received, on
average, 94 percent of the EITC amount claimed on the original return.”); see also 2012 NTA,
Study of Tax Court Cases, supra note 76 (noting that in cases where the IRS concedes the EITC
during Tax Court litigation there was ample opportunity for that result to be settled upon in audit
and arguing this indicates the EITC audit process is flawed).
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return; if the custodial parent does not also claim the child, then there is little on
the face of the returns that would indicate a problem. The IRS would have to
rely on additional research or random sample audits to detect the
noncompliance.
In either case, the IRS must audit the noncustodial parent, and the case
can take a year or more to resolve, using up IRS resources that could be
dedicated to other purposes. In the meantime, the IRS may have paid the refund
to the taxpayer. 243 The IRS must wait to collect the debt until after the audit is
over, plus any administrative or U.S. Tax Court appeals.244 At that point, the
taxpayer has almost certainly spent the erroneous refund and cannot pay the
liability without serious economic burden. This means the IRS will have to
devote additional resources to collecting the tax liability and, in fact, may never
fully collect the debt. 245
C. Effectiveness in Advancing Policy Goals
1. The EITC in General
Tax policy can be judged using more inclusive measures than equity
and efficiency; one can analyze a rule’s broader societal costs and whether a
rule actually achieves its stated policy objectives. Most scholars agree that the
current EITC has been very successful in achieving its policy objectives. The
stated purpose of the EITC when it was adopted in 1975 was to offset payroll
taxes for low-income workers. 246 By its design, it achieves this purpose quite
well. The credit rate for the non-child-based EITC is 7.65%, equal to the
employee’s share of payroll taxes. Many have questioned whether this policy
objective would be better served by simply exempting a certain level of wages
from payroll taxes. 247 Others have argued that the EITC operates as a subsidy
243

The IRS has authority to freeze refunds it suspects are improper. See generally IRS,
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 21.5.6.4.7 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part21/
irm_21-005-006r.html. However, often the audit occurs after the EITC has already been paid.
244
The IRS has general authority to assess income tax pursuant to Code section 6201, but
Code section 6213 restricts the assessment of a deficiency in the reported tax until after Tax
Court proceedings have been completed. I.R.C. §§ 6201, 6213 (2014). Code section 6331 permits
the IRS to collect tax by levy, but only after notice and demand is made pursuant to Code section
6303, which can only happen after the IRS has made an assessment. I.R.C. §§ 6331, 6303. See
also 2 KEITH FOGG, EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS, ch. 10 (5th Ed.
2011).
245
The IRS has ten years to collect tax debt using administrative measures such as liens and
levies. I.R.C. § 6502. Additionally, the taxpayer may submit a successful offer in compromise,
lowering their debt to as low as $1. I.R.C. § 7122; IRS Form 656 (rev. 1-2014).
246
See supra note 29.
247
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 178–81 (2008); Jonathan Barry Forman,
Making Social Security Work, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 172–73 (2004).
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for employers that artificially lowers wages, and that rather than offsetting
payroll taxes with the EITC, the government should legislate a living minimum
wage. 248 Despite these and similar calls for reform, it seems clear that the EITC
fulfills its goal of offsetting payroll taxes and providing a work incentive for
low-wage workers.
Another clear purpose of the EITC was to create a cash assistance
program that incentivizes people to work. Studies consistently show that the
EITC has resulted in higher participation in the workforce by low-income
workers, particularly single mothers. 249 Theoretically, there are anti-work
incentives at the margins; a worker might reject extra hours to avoid triggering
the phase-out; a worker might be better off cutting back on hours to escape the
phase-out. While there is a theoretical incentive to reduce work for taxpayers in
or near the phase-out range, the studies show that taxpayers do not actually
work reduced hours, or that the reduction is very small. 250
2. The Custodial-Parent-Only Rule
Does the Custodial-Parent-Only Rule advance the policy goals of the
EITC? As discussed above, the stated purpose of the EITC in 1975 was to
offset the regressive nature of payroll taxes on low-income workers. 251 Another
clear purpose of the EITC, especially after 1993, is delivering needs-based cash
assistance payments to lower-income people. 252 Both of these goals can be
judged by the amount of EITC that reaches working people; the higher the
credit, the greater the payroll tax offset effect and the greater the assistance
received.
Although it does not hinder these goals in many cases, the CustodialParent-Only Rule never advances these goals. In situations where both parents
in a Two Home Family are making relatively equal earned income, these goals
arguably are not hindered. When both parents in a Two Home Family are
making relatively equal income, a rule that limits the EITC to only the custodial
parent does not result in a lower credit, as opposed to a rule that allows either

248

See, e.g., Zelenak, Family-Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer, Adopting the Family Taxable Unit, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 69
(“[I]t is ‘widely accepted’ that the Earned Income Tax Credit increased labor force participation
by single mothers.”); see also Bradley T. Heim, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on
the Labor Supply of Married Couples: A Structural Estimation (Jan. 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/faculty/pdf/heim_EITCFamLS.pdf.
249

250
See Thomas L. Hungerford & Rebecca Thiess, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Child Tax Credit: History, Purpose, Goals, and Effectiveness, 370 ECON. POL’Y INST. 1 (2013),
available at http://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-income-tax-credit-and-the-child-taxcredit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/; Meyer, supra note 211, at 168; Greene, supra
note 5; Heim, supra note 249.
251
See supra note 29.
252

See supra note 42.
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parent (but not both) to claim the credit.253 Regardless of which parent claims
the credit, it will have the same effect on the identified goals because each
parent makes the same amount of money. 254 However, where the custodial
parent makes less earned income than the noncustodial parent, the identified
goals are hindered by the Custodial-Parent-Only Rule. Even if the family’s
combined income does not change, the credit is lowered or eliminated simply
because the custodial parent makes a lower share of the family income. The
Author can think of no situation where the Custodial-Parent-Only Rule would
generate a higher credit than a rule that allows either parent to claim the EITC.
The EITC’s goal of encouraging work seems to be advanced by the
Custodial-Parent-Only Rule. The custodial parent is encouraged to work
because only the custodial parent is permitted to claim the EITC. However, this
positive work incentive for the custodial parent is counterbalanced by a
disincentive to work for the noncustodial parent. The noncustodial parent
cannot claim the EITC (at least not the child-based EITC) and, therefore, has
no incentive to work. As public policy, these incentives are skewed. If society
must choose which parent to incentivize to work, it seems more logical to
incentivize the parent with fewer child care responsibilities.
D. Neutrality
Tax neutrality suggests that the Code, to the extent possible, should not
cause people to alter behavior solely for tax reasons unless there is a public
policy reason for doing so. 255 By design, the EITC is intended to spur lowincome people toward work. It does this well, and the United States has a
strong public policy in favor of encouraging able-bodied individuals to work.
Even though a primary purpose of the EITC is to cause people to alter their
behavior, tax neutrality is not violated because there is a public policy reason
for this effect. However, there are clear tax neutrality implications to the
marriage incentives and disincentives built into the EITC.
Marriage incentives and disincentives are problems within the structure
of the tax system in general and the EITC in particular.256 The EITC’s structure
encourages some taxpayers to cohabit rather than marry. There is an incentive
to cohabit rather than marry when either (1) the taxpayers can split children
between two EITC-eligible returns or (2) the potential spouse’s income would

253

Naturally, the credit would be maximized if separated parents were allowed to combine
their incomes, but that would create large equity concerns.
254
As compared to a Married Couple or Cohabiting Couple with the same family-level earned
income, the results would vary. For higher-income non-married families, splitting income means
having less EITC income, which can avoid the phase-out rules. However, for lower-income
married families, combining income can increase the EITC.
255
See Donaldson, supra note 184, at 550–51.
256

See Bradshaw, supra note 190.
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push the couple into the phase-out range if married. 257 Despite the Author’s
insistence in this Article that the government should respect individuals’
autonomy with regard to marriage choices, there clearly is no policy reason for
discouraging marriage. The EITC will encourage other taxpayers to marry. For
example, a taxpayer with children and little to no earned income is incentivized
to marry a taxpayer with enough earned income (but not too much) to obtain
the EITC. While an incentive to marry seems like a more reasonable result, it
can have pernicious effects, such as encouraging a battered woman to stay with
a violent husband. There do not appear to be any sensible policy justifications
for these varying incentives.
As noted in supra Part IV.A.3, studies suggest that the Code’s marriage
incentives and disincentives have little impact on taxpayers’ actual marriage
decisions on a macro level. However, more work needs to be done in this area
to reach a firm conclusion. It seems clear that the EITC has some impact on a
micro or family level, meaning it must cause some families to alter their
behavior. It also seems reasonable to hypothesize that the Custodial-ParentOnly Rule in particular could have a large non-neutral, behavior-altering effect
because the potential impact of the Custodial-Parent-Only Rule can be so
severe, up to and including a complete forfeiture of the EITC. Even if there is
little prospective effect on marriage decisions, there are clear retrospective
inequitable results that occur following changes in living situations. Regardless
of the actual level of behavior alteration, there is much to be said even for
symbolic neutrality. Symbolic neutrality would contribute to a perception that
our tax rules are fair and could even encourage better compliance.
V.

PROPOSAL

This Article’s proposal is powerful largely because it is simple.
However, adopting this one simple change would dramatically improve the
ability of families to make personal decisions without having those decisions
needlessly warped by the fear of losing the EITC. The proposal respects the
basic freedom of people to liberty and autonomy. Custodial parents already
have the ability to transfer the dependent exemption and child tax credit to
noncustodial parents by signing Form 8332. The proposal simply would extend
this ability to the EITC. This part outlines the specific change proposed by this
Article, illustrates the effect of this Article’s proposed change, looks at other
proposals for change, and analyzes the proposed change under tax policy
measures.

257

See supra Part IV.A.1 (analyzing hypothetical situations and noting incentives to cohabit
rather than marry).
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A. Specific Proposed Change
Accomplishing EITC portability is a simple matter. Currently, Code
section 32(c)(3) reads “[t]he term ‘qualifying child’ means a qualifying child of
the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c), determined without regard to
paragraph (1)(D) thereof and section 152(e)).” The effect of this language is to
disregard the normal support test in Code section 152(c)(1)(D) and the special
rules in Code section 152(e) which allow a custodial parent to transfer a tax
benefit to a noncustodial parent. The Author proposes that Code section
32(c)(3) be changed to read “[t]he term ‘qualifying child’ means a qualifying
child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c), determined without regard
to paragraph (1)(D) thereof).”
B. Effect of Making the EITC Available for Tax Arbitrage
To demonstrate the impact of full EITC portability on a Two Home
Family, return to the case study presented in the Introduction and in supra Part
III.E and add some details. Recall that Mom has primary custody of two
children and cannot find work. Dad fell behind on child support when he lost
his job. He was finally able to find two low-wage, part-time jobs. Mom and
Dad returned to court to revisit Dad’s child support obligations. Dad resumed
regular payments, but did not have enough current income to begin paying his
past due support. Under current law, as discussed in supra Part III.E, Mom can
allow Dad to claim certain child-based tax benefits, resulting in a net positive
tax situation of $2,828.75 (i.e., the family is $2,828.75 richer). Because Dad
had child support arrearages, Mom negotiated that Dad would pay her the full
$2,828.75 toward the arrearages.
If the EITC were also portable, the family’s tax situation significantly
improves, as follows, using 2014 figures:
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CUSTODIAL MOM
NONCUSTODIAL DAD
IF MOM USES CHILD-BASED TAX BENEFITS:
Income
$0
$20,000
Less standard
deduction
($9,100) (HOH) 258
($6,200) (single)
($11,850) (3 persons)
Less exemptions
($3,950) (1 person)
$0
Taxable income
$9,850
$0
Tentative tax
$1,023.75
($0)
Less child tax credit
($0)
$0
Tax
$1,023.75
Less additional child
($0)
tax credit
($0)
($0)
Less EITC
($0) 259
Tax owed
$0
$1,023.75
IF DAD USES CHILD-BASED TAX BENEFITS:
Income
$0
$20,000
Less standard
deduction
($9,100) (HOH)
($6,200) (single)
Less exemptions
($3,950) (1 person)
($11,850) (3 persons)
Taxable income
$0
$1,950
Tentative tax
$0
$195
Less child tax credit
($0)
($195)
Tax
$0
$0
Less additional child
tax credit
($0)
($1,805)
Less EITC
($0)
($5,003) 260
Tax owed
$0
($6,808) [refund]
Change in Tax
Liability
$0
$7,831.75
Recall that under current rules, there is a net gain of $2,828.75 when
Mom shifts the exemptions and the child tax credit to Dad; $2,828.75 that
would not exist but for the shift in tax benefits and which Mom could negotiate
that Dad pay her to lower his arrearages. Here, with EITC portability, there is a
net gain of $7,831.75. That might enable Dad to pay off his support arrearage
and increase his future payments to Mom. This is good for Dad and good for
Mom, but most importantly, it is good for the kids.

258

HOH is an abbreviation for head of household filing status.
Dad would be eligible for the EITC for a childless worker, but makes too much earned
income. In 2014, this EITC is fully phased out for incomes above $14,590.
260
This reflects the credit available to workers with two qualifying children, reduced by the
phase-out, as follows: [$5,460 – (($20,000 - $17,830) * 21.06%)].
259
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C. Other Proposals for Change
The Author found one other proposal that directly addresses the
Custodial-Parent-Only Rule. The President’s Economic Recovery Advisory
Board (“PERAB”) prepared a report in 2010 that recognized the desirability of
“clarify[ing]” the rules regarding waivers of child tax benefits. 261 That report
concluded that “one option to address the situation is to eliminate the ability of
divorced or separated parents to exchange tax benefits.” The report noted that
such an elimination would have efficiency benefits and improve horizontal
equity when comparing individuals in similar custodial and residential
situations. 262 It also simplistically claimed that taxes for custodial parents
would be reduced. 263 As explained in this Article, that is true only assuming the
custodial parent has income. This Article’s approach is superior because it also
would clarify the rules, simplify the EITC, improve horizontal equity on a
family-unit basis, and produce efficiency gains by improving EITC
compliance. However, this Article’s proposal achieves these goals while also
preserving access to an important federal tax benefit and respecting families’
rights to self-determination by reducing the influence tax rules have on living
and custody decisions. The 2010 PERAB report was cited in a 2013 Senate
Finance Committee Staff paper as including a proposal to “simplify[] [the]
rules governing which parent can claim the EITC when parents are
separated.” 264 It is true that elimination would be simpler and more efficient,
but the Author fervently hopes that the government does not “simplify” the
rules out of existence.
Other proposals have targeted noncustodial parents not eligible for the
EITC. A separate EITC for noncustodial parents was proposed in 2007 by
Senator Evan Bayh and then-Senator Barack Obama. 265 Senator Bayh
reintroduced the idea in 2009. 266 New York State 267 and Washington, D.C., 268
have state versions of a noncustodial parent EITC. Most of these proposals are

261

See PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., supra note 219, at 22.
See id. Of course, it would be most “efficient” to eliminate the tax benefits entirely.
However, assuming the social gains from the benefits offset the losses to efficiency, the question
is how to improve efficiency while maintaining access to the benefits.
262

263

Id. at 23.
SENATE FIN. COMM., 113TH CONG., STAFF TAX REFORM OPTIONS FOR DISCUSSION:
FAMILIES, EDUCATION AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2013), available at http://www.finance.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/041813%20Family%20Education,%20and%20Opportunities%20Options%2
0Paper.pdf.
265
Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2007, S. 1626, 110th Cong. (2007).
264

266
267
268

Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2009, S. 1309, 111th Cong. (2009).
N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(d-1) (Consol. 2014).
D.C. CODE § 47-1806.04(g) (2014).
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conditioned on compliance with child support obligations. 269 The adoption of a
proposal similar to these would be of great value to low-income families,
especially where the custodial parent is able to fully utilize the EITC. This
Article’s proposal, however, targets the situation where the custodial parent
cannot take full advantage of the EITC because of unemployment or
underemployment.
Like the proposals for a separate EITC for noncustodial parents, should
this Article’s proposal be conditioned on compliance with child support
obligations? This Article explicitly rejects such a requirement being imposed
by the Code and enforced by the IRS. While it is an understandable reaction to
want to deny tax benefits to a “dead beat parent,” this type of requirement is not
an efficient mechanism for offering benefits to noncustodial parents. In
addition, it would needlessly complicate tax administration.
The noncustodial parents most in need of a boosted EITC are those
experiencing underemployment (to supplement wages) or who have
experienced periods of prior unemployment (to pay off debts that usually
accrue during unemployment). However, these noncustodial parents also are
the most likely to have child support arrearages.270 Conditioning an EITC (or
other child-based tax benefit) for noncustodial parents on current compliance
with child support undercuts the effectiveness of the program in meeting the
needs of the targeted population. Allowing EITC tax arbitrage is more likely to
boost child support compliance rates.271 A study of the incidence of currently
allowable tax arbitrage estimated that when noncustodial parents claimed the
child tax credit, the custodial parent would see an increase in child support rates
of up to 9%. 272 Extending permissible tax arbitrage to the EITC, which involves
greater amounts of money, should result in even higher increases in child
support rates.
Conditioning tax benefits on paying child support makes it difficult for
taxpayers to know with certainty at filing time whether or not they are entitled
to the tax benefits. What level of child support compliance is sufficient? Who
makes that decision? The answers are unlikely to be sufficiently clear at tax
time to enable accurate filing. This merely creates needless risk for taxpayers.
If both parents claim the children, perhaps with legitimate reason to believe this
is accurate, both will likely be audited and one will lose the audit. One of these
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low-income people will be in the unenviable position of repaying the EITC, 273
plus penalties and interest, probably after a prolonged audit and appeal process
and possibly litigation. In any case, the family’s limited income will be used for
paying a tax bill rather than supporting the children or paying past due or
current child support. 274
The custodial parent has the power to consent or not consent to the
transfer of the tax benefits to the noncustodial parent. This consent can be given
year-by-year or made effective for a range of future years. The waiver can be
revoked by the custodial parent any time until the end of the relevant tax
year. 275 Thus, the custodial parent can self-police compliance with child
support obligations before signing the waiver. Alternatively, either party can
ask a court to compel the waiver if child support obligations have been met or
to bless the withholding of the waiver if they have not. 276 While there are some
opportunities for unfair or complicated results, this Article’s proposal has the
distinct benefit of placing the decision in the hands of the parties involved
and/or the courts rather than the IRS. The IRS is ill-suited for policing child
support agreements. 277 Leaving the IRS in charge of this function is inefficient
and more likely to lead to erroneous results because of the inherent limits of the
investigative function of an audit as opposed to a court proceeding.
Allowing full EITC portability would empower low-income taxpayers
to improve their financial condition using tax arbitrage. 278 Rather than relying
on default provisions in the Code, which simply guess the party to whom the
benefit is best directed, the taxpayers themselves can make this determination.
If the family’s income increases by having the custodial parent claim the EITC,
then the parties could agree to that. 279 However, if the family’s income
increases by having the noncustodial parent claim the EITC, then the parties
could agree to that, perhaps coupled with an agreement by the noncustodial
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parent to pay all or a portion of the credit to the custodial parent. For example,
if the noncustodial parent has a support arrearage, the parents could agree (or a
court could order) that the noncustodial parent will direct 100% of the EITC (or
100% of the tax savings) toward the arrearage. This benefits everyone
involved; the child and custodial parent have increased financial stability and
the noncustodial parent works towards compliance. If the noncustodial parent is
current on child support, different arrangements may be desirable. The
noncustodial parent’s net tax benefit could be split evenly; more complicated
but more equitable, the noncustodial parent could be required to pay the
custodial parent an amount equal to the custodial parent’s net tax loss plus half
of the “tax arbitrage” savings. 280
This Article’s proposal replaces a rigid rule that attempts to ensure the
credit benefits the child with a flexible rule that enables the child’s parents to
structure an arrangement that is more likely to ensure this result. In addition to
being more efficient and more likely to yield the desired results, allowing full
EITC portability respects the autonomy of lower-income taxpayers. Rather than
imposing a rule to order the affairs of lower-income taxpayers, this Article’s
approach enables them to order their own affairs.
D. Equity
Recall from the discussion above that “horizontal equity” requires that
similarly situated taxpayers bear similar tax burdens. This Article analyzed the
horizontal equity of the current rules in terms of comparing similarly situated
taxpayers eligible for the EITC and determined that the current rules frequently
break the principle of horizontal equity. Among two-earner couples, the
Cohabiting Couple almost always has the highest EITC and Married Couples
have a higher EITC than Two Home Families at lower-income levels.
Importantly, though, when looking at one-earner families where the sole or
principal wage earner is not also the custodial parent, the Two Home Family
can experience a complete forfeiture of the EITC.
With respect to two-earner families, this Article’s proposal to allow
custodial parents to shift the EITC to noncustodial parents promotes horizontal
equity between One Home Families and Two Home Families, although it does
not achieve true parity of result. Recall the comparison of a two-earner couple
with two children making $10,000 each. Under current law, the Two Home
Family would generate a $4,000 EITC (claimed by the custodial parent), the
Married Couple would generate a $5,460 EITC, and the Cohabiting Couple
would generate a $6,610 credit ($3,305 of which is claimed by each parent).
Under this Article’s proposal, the Two Home Family could achieve the same
result as the Cohabiting Couple. The custodial parent could keep the right to
claim one of the children and transfer the right to claim the other to the
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noncustodial parent. Each parent would generate an EITC of $3,305, or $6,610
for the family. However, the Married Couple would generate a lower credit
than either the Cohabiting Couple or the Two Home Family—$5,460 versus
$6,610.
The same is true when comparing families with two children and
$30,000 of family income divided evenly between two wage earners. Under
this Article’s proposed rule, the Two Home Families could generate a $6,610
EITC, the same as a Cohabiting Couple. However, the Married Couple would
only generate a $4,040.56 EITC because the Married Couple is subject to the
phase-out. 281
Thus, while this Article’s proposal promotes horizontal equity between
Two Home Families and Cohabiting Couples, it worsens the inequity between
Married Couples and Two Home Families with respect to two-earner families.
This inequity is a function of the EITC’s structure and the realities of joint
filing. 282 One source of the inequity is the ability of the Cohabiting Couple (and
the Two Home Family under this Article’s proposed change) to split two or
more children between two EITC-eligible returns. 283 Married couples cannot
split children on separate EITC-eligible returns; if they file as married filing
separate, they are ineligible for the EITC. This inequity could easily be fixed by
allowing married filing separate taxpayers to claim the EITC. 284 Another
potential fix, but one which would have an impact more far-reaching than the
EITC, would be to eliminate joint filing and tax everyone as individuals.285
A thorough analysis of these alternatives to improving equity is outside
the scope of this Article. However, it is clear that eliminating joint filing or
allowing married filing separate taxpayers to claim the EITC also would
eliminate another important source of EITC marriage inequity. Currently,
married taxpayers are forced to combine incomes when claiming the EITC. For
lower-income taxpayers, this is usually a benefit, allowing the couple to claim a
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higher EITC than if they were taxed as individuals.286 However, for taxpayers
with relatively higher incomes, 287 the joint income requirement is a detriment,
leading to a lower EITC than if they had been taxed as individuals.288 This
causes disparities among married couples and also between married couples
and non-married couples. It is not only an incentive or disincentive to marriage,
but also an incentive or disincentive for the “second” wage earner spouse
(typically the mother, though certainly not always) to work. 289
When looking at one-earner families, this Article’s proposal enhances
parity between One Home Families and Two Home Families. Under current
law, one-earner Married Couples have a slight advantage over one-earner
Cohabiting Couples because Married Couples have a more extended phase-out
range than non-married couples. This Article’s proposal does not change that.
However, it allows the Two Home Family to allocate the EITC to the parent
with earned income, something that One Home Families already can do under
the current law. This promotes horizontal equity.
This Article does not attempt to address or solve all the EITC parity
issues. Solutions for the EITC’s marriages disincentives involve much more
extensive legislative changes than appear practicable in the current political
climate; also, because the potential solutions usually affect other tax attributes
and can create different inequities, they deserve a more thoughtful and
thorough analysis than is possible in this Article. The inequity that is the focus
of this Article, the one with such a harsh result, is the complete forfeiture of the
EITC for Two Home Families where the custodial parent does not work. This
Article’s proposal to allow the custodial parent to shift the right to the EITC to
the noncustodial parent prevents this harshest of results; it prevents the
complete forfeiture of the EITC even if it does not guarantee perfect equity of
result among all similarly situated taxpayers.
Recall that “vertical equity” requires that taxpayers who are not
similarly situated bear tax burdens relative to their respective abilities to pay.
Stated differently, differences in tax burdens should be explained by
differences in abilities to pay based on differing circumstances and not by other
factors. The current rules violate vertical equity because the differences in the
amounts of credit generated by cohabiting, married, and separated families
cannot be explained by differences in their respective abilities to pay. On the
contrary, because of economies of scale, the intact families should have a
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greater ability to pay than the separated families, yet the separated families
often generate lower credit amounts than the intact families.
This Article’s proposal to allow EITC portability between custodial
and noncustodial parents promotes vertical equity because it promotes
horizontal equity. The proposal eliminates the difference in tax burdens for
families that are making similar amounts of income. Thus vertical equity is
satisfied. It is true that the One Home Family likely has a greater ability to pay
due to economies of scale, and thus perhaps should bear a greater tax burden
under vertical equity principles. However, lowering the EITC simply because a
family lives together as opposed to apart would create exactly the sort of
perverse incentive this Article is arguing against. The cost in vertical equity is
worth the gain in neutrality.
E. Efficiency
Recall that efficiency traditionally is judged by analyzing a rule’s
indirect and direct costs. Indirect costs are to taxpayers for attempting to
comply with the law and direct costs are to the government for administering
the tax law. 290 The indirect and direct costs of the current rule allowing only
custodial parents to claim an EITC are high. Taxpayers have a hard time
complying with the law because of its complexity, and the government has a
hard time administering the law because of the nature of the examination and
collection functions.
It might seem at first blush that it would more efficient for the statute to
define a single person eligible to claim the EITC, as is done under current law.
Such bright line rules typically are easier for taxpayers to follow and the IRS to
administer. This Article’s proposal requires taxpayer action to shift the EITC
and also requires the IRS to process the Forms 8332 where taxpayers have
shifted the EITC. Recall that current law already allows taxpayers to shift
dependents for certain tax purposes. Therefore, the system is already tolerant of
the relatively minor inefficiencies involved in shifting dependents. Adding the
EITC does not add substantially to the existing inefficiencies. Indeed, this
Article’s proposal should be more efficient than the current rule. This is
because it is easier conceptually for taxpayers to shift all tax benefits for a child
rather than picking and choosing. Under current law, if a custodial parent signs
Form 8332, transferring the dependent exemption to the noncustodial parent,
that automatically also transfers the right to claim a child tax credit for the
child. However, even if the custodial parent has signed a Form 8332, he or she
can still claim an EITC with respect to the child. Therefore, the tax benefits for
the child are split, contrary to the normal rule. The normal rule of not being
able to “split the baby” is ingrained in our common understanding of how
children affect tax obligations. Thus, following the “normal” rule should reduce
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error by custodial and noncustodial parents alike. 291 Similarly, it should be
much easier for the IRS to police a system where a child can be claimed by
only one taxpayer for all tax benefits and where that eligible taxpayer is easily
determined by a simple form that is filed with the return.
F. Effectiveness in Advancing Policy Goals
Allowing EITC portability should increase the amount of EITC money
available to taxpayers. Taxpayers currently unable to claim the EITC would
have access to an important anti-poverty program. Two Home Families
underutilizing the EITC because it is allocated to the parent with lower earned
income will similarly be able to access funds that could help lift them out of
poverty. Thus, the Article’s proposal enhances the EITC’s policy goal of
reducing poverty. Because it could be expected that payments will increase, the
EITC’s policy goal of offsetting payroll taxes would similarly be enhanced.
Work incentives are probably slightly enhanced by the proposed EITC
portability. Currently, the only parent incentivized to work is the custodial
parent, arguably the one society should be supporting in balancing work hours
and child care responsibilities. With EITC portability, the parents together have
an interest in maximizing the EITC. Therefore, assuming a cooperative
relationship, the parent best able to find and maintain employment is
incentivized to work.
G. Neutrality
Tax neutrality demands that the Code not cause people to alter
behavior solely for tax reasons unless there is a public policy reason for doing
so. The current rule fails a neutrality standard because it encourages lowincome taxpayers to not marry (or to divorce) in order to generate a larger
EITC. It also frequently penalizes parents who decide to separate by giving the
family unit a lower EITC or eliminating it altogether. While there is some
evidence that the EITC’s marriage incentives do not alter taxpayer behavior in
the aggregate, 292 policy makers should be concerned about any potentially
perverse incentive on the individual level and should opt for more neutral
policies when possible. Neutrality, even symbolic neutrality, is a critical factor
in taxpayers’ perceptions of the tax system as being fair or not.
This Article’s proposal reduces the penalty upon separation, although it
does not eliminate the penalty entirely. For the Two Home Family where the
parents earn equal amounts of income, this Article’s proposal enables the Two
Home Family to generate the same amount of EITC as a Cohabiting Couple.
This is true because, just as Cohabiting Couples now can, the Two Home
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Family would be able to agree between themselves who should claim the
children and could allocate the children in a manner that maximizes the EITC.
For the Two Home Family where only the noncustodial parent has earned
income, this Article’s proposal can prevent the total forfeiture of that family’s
EITC.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The last 40 years have seen a movement away from direct cash
assistance to needy families and an increasing reliance on tax transfer
programs, like the EITC, to lift American families and children out of poverty.
Given the importance of these programs to the people they are intended to
benefit, it is critical that they be structured in ways that are equitable and that
are designed to direct the benefits to the intended beneficiaries.
There currently are complex and entrenched inequities in the EITC
structure that operate to treat married couples differently (and most often more
poorly) than non-married couples. This Article has described some of those
inequities and has sketched out some of the possible solutions. The solutions to
those problems would require a fair degree of political will to enact.
However, there is a very great inequity in the system that is easy to fix.
That is the inequity between One Home Families and Two Home Families
where the custodial parent has little to no earned income. Allowing a custodial
parent to transfer the right to claim the EITC to the noncustodial parent
alleviates this inequity. Allowing EITC portability can increase family-level
income, improve child support compliance, and improve overall child welfare.

